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Essays in Alternative Financial Services
Alejo Czerwonko
“Alternative financial services” is a term often used to describe the array of financial services offered by
providers that operate outside of federally insured banks. More than one in four households in the United
States are either unbanked or underbanked, a number that has been growing steadily since 2009, according
to the FDIC. These households conduct some or all of their financial transactions outside of the mainstream
banking system. Many rely on alternative financial services providers. Rent-to-own stores, pawn shops,
and payday lenders are the largest providers of credit within the alternative financial services world. This
dissertation studies the rent-to-own industry.
The rent-to-own agreement provides consumers immediate access to durable goods without a credit check
or down payment. In a typical transaction, an agreement is written for a period of 12 to 24 months. The
item is delivered immediately and rental payments are made monthly. At the end of each month, a consumer
can continue to rent by paying for an additional period, or can return the good to the store without further
obligation. Consumers obtain ownership of the good by renting to term or through early payment of a
pre-specified cash price. What makes the study of rent-to-own contracts interesting is the unique nature
of the agreement. Neither a credit sale nor a pure lease, this contract is the cornerstone of an industry
that serves more than six million Americans each year, operates 9,800 storefronts in all 50 U.S. states and
Canada, generates over US$ 8.5 billion in revenues a year, and employs more than 50,000 individuals. The
industry has drawn attention from regulators and consumer advocacy groups. At the heart of the debate is
the ostensibly high price of the transaction, and the allegedly overwhelming profitability of the firms in the
industry.
The first chapter of this dissertation introduces and motivates my dissertation research. It is followed
by a chapter containing an overview of the different literatures my works builds on. I contribute to these
literatures in several ways. To begin with, I develop the most detailed and comprehensive analysis of the
rent-to-own contract, the industry’s institutional details and its regulatory framework. It is also the first
fully independent study of rent-to-own using micro-level data. To the best of my knowledge, there is no other
study based on transaction-level data that has not been commissioned by the industry. This dissertation also
contains the first piece of work on the rent-to-own industry to employ structural estimation techniques, and
therefore the first to credibly analyze the consequences of contract changes, regulatory changes and other
counterfactual exercises on social welfare.
Chapter 3 analyzes the characteristics of rent-to-own contracts and key components of the industry. Some
of the questions I answer along the way are: What is rent-to-own? What makes the contract unique? Is
rent-to-own expensive to consumers? Who are the main market participants? What do customers look like
and how do they behave? What do firms look like and how do they perform? A proper understanding of
the rent-to-own market is essential to assess the value of the transaction to consumers and firms, as well as
to design sensible regulatory frameworks.
I find that while rent-to-own looks expensive compared to cash retail and credit sale transactions, it does
not when benchmarked against pure leases. And those unbanked or underbanked U.S. households wanting to
access durable goods may have nowhere else to turn to. There is no evidence that the rent-to-own activity is
overwhelmingly profitable. The industry seems to be competitive and the performance of rent-to-own firms
stands roughly in the median of the distribution of profitability across industries in the U.S.
In chapter 4 I use proprietary micro-level data from a medium-sized rent-to-own chain in Ohio to analyze
the behavior of consumers and the transaction-level performance of firms. The reduced-form analysis carried
out in this chapter helps us understand contract use in the context of rent-to-own. I address the controversy
regarding the proportion of rent-to-own customers that rent items to term. Consumer advocates say the
great majority of them do; the industry association states 75% return the rented item within the first four
months of the contract. The analysis of micro-level data shows that the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
The data also reveal that consumers respond to the incentives and trade-offs presented to them by the
contract. During the first half of the rent-to-own agreement, consumers mostly make rental payments or
return the item. During the second half, as the early purchase option becomes more affordable, an increasing
amount of consumers exercise it. Many of them just stop making payments and do not return the item.
Delinquency is a serious problem in the industry that significantly affects the performance of rent-to-own
firms. Furniture items and appliances, items that suffer the least from delinquency, are the most profitable
product categories.
The data description chapter motivates the development of a dynamic structural model of consumer
behavior and firm performance. Chapter 5 presents the model, describes the estimation procedure and lists
the challenges I had to be overcome along the way.
I present the results of estimating the model using transaction-level data of rent-to-own contracts, as well
as a series of robustness tests in chapter 6. The model does a very good job at fitting observed consumer
behavior and the robustness tests yield favorable results, which increases my confidence in the estimation
procedure and results. I use these demand estimates to analyze contract design, that is, how the different
dimensions of the rent-to-own contract affect consumer satisfaction and firm performance. The counterfactual
exercises suggest there exist potential changes to the contract terms that can make both consumers and firms
better off. I find that reducing the flexibility of the rent-to-own contract in terms of the return option, while
simultaneously decreasing the monthly rental rate, yields higher social welfare. Also, if regulation restricting
the shape of the early purchase option schedule was lifted, the rent-to-own firm could alter the schedule in
such a way as to make both consumers and the firm better off. This would entail a higher early purchase
option price at the beginning of the rent-to-own contract, but this price would decrease faster over time than
what the current regulation dictates. Finally, I show that better theft prevention measures could improve
the performance of rent-to-own firms significantly. Rent-to-own operators could then transfer part of their
increased revenue to consumers in the form of lower monthly rental rates.
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More than one in four households in the United States are either unbanked or underbanked, a number that
has been growing steadily since 2009, according to the FDIC1. Many low and middle income households face a
number of barriers to bank account ownership. First, regular checking accounts may not make economic sense
for some lower income families. Consumers who cannot meet account balance minimums pay high monthly
fees, and most banks levy high charges for bounced checks, which families living paycheck to paycheck cannot
afford. Second, there may be cultural reasons, like mistrust of banks or dislike of dealing with banks. Third,
many unbanked persons may not qualify for conventional bank accounts because of poor credit history or
prior problems with managing a bank account2. Finally, lack of financial literacy has also been suggested as
a reason3.
These households therefore conduct some or all of their financial transactions outside of the mainstream
banking system. Many rely on alternative financial services (AFS) providers. This is a term often used to
describe the array of financial services offered by providers that operate outside of federally insured banks.
One-quarter of U.S. households have used at least one AFS product in the last year, and almost one in ten
households have used two or more types of AFS products4. The total transaction volume of AFS is estimated
at more than $320 billion annually5.
AFS can be categorized as transactional financial services, and those that provide credit. The most
widely used transaction products and services are check cashing services and money orders. Financial Service
Centers of America (FiSCA), the national trade association that represents nonbank financial service centers,






2more than $58 billion. FiSCA also estimates that its members sell money orders with a face value of $17.6
billion per year. Another AFS under the transaction category is that of stored value (prepaid) cards, which
work as a replacement for cash and checks. This sector has grown tremendously in recent years. Finally,
remittances are also a big part of transactional AFS. The United States is the leading remittance-sending
country. During 2007, U.S. remittances to other countries totaled $46 billion 6.
Large national retailers are increasingly recognizing the revenue generating potential of transactional
AFS. Walmart, for example, the world’s largest retailer, has been providing check-cashing, money orders
and bill payment services since 2002. In collaboration with American Express, it has also launched a stored
value card in late 2012 that by January 2013 had over 575,000 account holders and $275 million in funds
loaded onto the cards7.
Pawn shops, payday lenders, buy-here-pay-here auto dealers, and rent-to-own stores are the largest
providers of credit within the alternative financial services world. Lusardi and Scheresberg (2013) docu-
ment that borrowing through these channels has become common in the United States: about one in four
Americans has used one of these methods in the past five years.
Pawn loans are small, short-term, collateralized loans. They have a median size of $70, and a median
term of 60 days. Consumers pawn mostly pieces of jewelry and tradesman’s tools, as well as various types
of electronics. Pawns do not require a credit check and can never negatively affect a customer’s credit. This
also means loans can be made quickly because verification of credit history or background information are
not required. Interest rates on the loan are heavily influenced by regulation, and vary widely from 2% to
25% monthly rates in different states. The industry operated close to 10,000 storefronts in the U.S. in 2012,
serving over 30 million Americans8.
As a form of short-term lending, a payday loan involves the borrower receiving certain cash advance from
the lender by authorizing her the right to deposit a personal check in typically two weeks, with the check’s
face value equal to the principal loan amount plus a charge. This charge typically lies between $15 and $20
for every $100 borrowed. Applicants can normally roll over the debt, but the law caps the loan duration
at 40 days. A one-time borrower who arrives with the necessary information (a check, recent pay stub,
copies of recent banks statements, and identification) can receive a loan in less than 30 minutes. These loans
offer convenience and discreetness9. In 2006, these outlets generated about $42 billion in payday loans, with
internet lenders adding another $5.65 billion10.
Buy-here-pay-here (BHPH) firms operate used car dealership. These companies sell to individuals with
6FDIC (2009).
7American Banker (2013).
8Czerwonko and Sun (2013).
9Wu (2008).
10FDIC (2009).
3low incomes or poor credit histories. Customers who arrive at a dealership fill out a loan application and are
matched to a car that fits their needs. Most customers finance a large fraction of the purchase and financing
options are adjusted to reflect credit-worthiness. The loans are risky and defaults are pervasive11. BHPH
is a fractured industry with few large or publicly traded participants. Transaction volume was estimated at
$80 billion per year in 200212.
This dissertation studies the rent-to-own industry. The agreement provides consumers immediate access
to durable goods without a credit check or down payment. In a typical transaction, an agreement is written
for a period of 12 to 24 months. The item is delivered immediately and rental payments are made monthly.
At the end of each month, a consumer can continue to rent by paying for an additional period, or can return
the good to the store without further obligation. Consumers obtain ownership of the good by renting to
term or through early payment of a pre-specified cash price.
What makes the study of rent-to-own contracts interesting is the unique nature of the agreement. Neither
a credit sale nor a pure lease, this contract is the cornerstone of an industry that serves more than six million
Americans each year, operates 9,800 storefronts in all 50 U.S. states and Canada, generates over US$ 8.5
billion in revenues a year, and employs more than 50,000 individuals.
The industry has drawn attention from regulators and consumer advocacy groups. At the heart of the
debate is the ostensibly high price of the transaction, and the allegedly overwhelming profitability of the
firms in the industry13. Rent-to-own is not well understood and my work will give the reader deep knowledge
of the industry. This will help assess whether consumer advocates’ concerns and accusation are supported by
the data. I provide facts on the cost of rent-to-own to consumer and compare this cost to that of competing
contractual arrangements. I also examine the performance of rent-to-own companies and contrast it to that
of firms in other industries and competing companies.
My dissertation mainly concerns with the behavior of consumers in the context of rent-to-own. I want to
understand the incentives and trade-offs individuals face, and how contract changes can affect behavior and
ultimately impact social welfare in the industry. Using a proprietary dataset of rent-to-own agreements, I
estimate a dynamic structural model of consumer choice. The estimated model is used to run counterfactual
exercises to analyze contract design: I introduce contract changes and test whether these can increase welfare.
One aspect of the rent-to-own contract that stands out is its high degree of flexibility. The agreement
emerged around 40 years ago as a highly flexible contract. Terms have not changed significantly over time,
with the Association of Progressive Rental Organizations (APRO), the industry association, taking a de-
11Einav et Al. (2012).
12FDIC (2009).
13Saunders (1997), Martin and Huckins (1997), Anderson and Jackson (2001).
4facto role of educating new entrants to the industry and transmitting best practices14. APRO’s website
states: “The unique rent-to-own transaction sprang up in the 1970s in response to a growing consumer
need for acquiring the use of household products without incurring debt or jeopardizing the family’s credit.
Rent-to-own customers [...] desire consumer durable goods in their homes without the long-term financial
obligations associated with credit sales. There is no interest charged to consumers, no credit checks involved
and customers can return the merchandise at any time for any reason without penalty. This no-obligation,
no-debt feature is the cornerstone of rental-purchase”15. When analyzing transaction-level data, I observe
that some customers seem to be taking advantage of the flexibility in the option to return items early. At the
same time, a large group of consumers does not seem to be making use of this lack of long-term commitment
at all. These observations motivate me to ask whether we can alter the rent-to-own contract terms in the
direction of reduced return flexibility to improve welfare.
Another research questions is motivated by the observation that industry participants are highly exposed
to regulatory risk. An average of 25 bills that directly affect the rent-to-own industry are introduced per
year at the state and federal levels of government16. The latest example of federal regulation attempts is the
Consumer Rental Purchase Agreement Act which was assigned to a congressional committee on April 15,
2013 and intends to assure meaningful disclosures of the terms of rental-purchase agreements and to provide
certain substantive rights to consumers under these agreements17. In Ohio, the state where the dataset used
in this study is from, regulation already imposes significant contract disclosures. The state also introduced
restrictions on the early purchase option price schedule. The chosen formula to dictate the shape of this
schedule does not seem to follow an economic rationale. I am therefore interested in understanding the
welfare cost of rent-to-own regulation in terms of restrictions on the early purchase option schedule.
Looking at micro-level data, I find that the number of items involved in rent-to-own agreements that are
stolen is considerably high. Almost 20% of TVs, 19% of electronics and 16% of computers end up in delin-
quency. Delinquency is a serious problem in the industry. This seems to indicate that firms should invest in
better delinquency control and implement more stringent rental initiation conditions. I also explore whether
these investments could increase overall welfare if part of the potential savings from lower delinquency levels
is transferred to consumers.
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the different literatures my
14Evidence of this can be found in APRO’s website which has a whole section dedicated to RTO education for RTO chains.
This includes links to a virtual university, with courses including “Introduction to Rent-To-Own” and “Account Management in




17More information on the Consumer Rental Purchase Agreement Act can be accessed at:
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1551.
5works builds on and points out my contribution to these literatures. An in-depth study of the characteristics
of rent-to-own contracts and key components of the industry is contained in chapter 3. Chapter 4 consists
of the analysis of proprietary microdata on rent-to-own transactions. The reduced-form analysis carried
out in that chapter helps understand consumer behavior and contract use, as well as the transaction-level
performance of rent-to-own firms. This analysis motivates the development of the dynamic structural model
of consumer behavior and firm performance presented in chapter 5. The results of estimating this model
are contained in chapter 6, where I also perform a series of robustness tests to increase the confidence in
the estimation procedure, and present a wide variety of counterfactual exercises. Chapter 7 concludes and
presents directions of future work.
6Chapter 2
Literature Review
As was described in the introduction to this dissertation, it is by now well documented that a significant
fraction of American households are unbanked or underbanked and that there is widespread use among these
of alternative financial services (AFS). More than one in four households in the U.S. are either unbanked
or underbanked, one-quarter of households have used at least one AFS product in the last year, and almost
one in ten households have used two or more types of AFS products (FDIC (2012)).
Low income Americans seem to lack sufficient access to credit and for the most part do not save. For
example, 57% of Americans earning less than $20,000 a year report that they would not be able to come
up with $2,000 in 30 days, compared to 10%-27% of those earning above $50,000 (Lusardi et al. (2011)).
According to the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances, only 32% of American families in the lowest income
quintile reported “saving over the past year”, compared to 60%-80% in the top two quintiles (Bricker et al.
(2012)).
These numbers give the reader a sense of the relevance of fringe banking. Despite its size, the AFS have
been severely overlooked by economists for many years. It was not until the 1990s that some researchers
became interested in studying the AFS world. No serious study of AFS in the United States had been made
since the 1930s.
2.1 Pioneering studies of alternative financial services
John Caskey’s book on fringe banking is widely considered the foundational study of the alternative financial
services industry (Caskey (1994)). In his work, Caskey describes the institutional details, customer bases
and growth of various AFS, with a strong focus on pawnbroking stores and check-cashing outlets.
Ten years after Caskey’s work, Barr (2004) and Bolton and Rosenthal (2005) provide a comprehensive
7introduction to credit markets for individuals in the fringe of mainstream financial services. This work
explores the dual financial services market in which insured depository institutions largely serve middle- and
upper-income persons, and AFS providers largely serve low- and moderate-income households. They provide
evidence that credit markets for the poor operate largely apart from the mainstream credit markets and are
mostly invisible to the wealthier borrowers. They argue that the efficiency and competitiveness of many
AFS could conceivably be improved along different dimensions. The authors conclude that better access to
financial services is critical for low-income persons seeking to enter the economic mainstream. Their work
therefore calls for governments to provide incentives for mainstream financial services to lower the barriers
for currently unbanked and underbanked individuals.
This work has motivated significant policy efforts to “bank the poor”. These efforts have concentrated
on both the supply and the demand sides. Incentives for banks to serve the unbanked and in particular to
offer accounts that are more suitable for their needs were provided. The unbanked were encouraged to open
accounts, through financial literacy programs among other ways. Success of these efforts has been limited
(Lyons and Scherpf (2004), Cole et al. (2011)). And while “banking the poor” is a fairly uncontroversial
policy goal, some have argued that its benefits are often overstated (i.e. Prescott and Tatar (1999)).
The pioneering work on AFS presented in Caskey (1994), Barr (2004) and Bolton and Rosenthal (2005)
also highlight the importance of financial literacy in understanding AFS use. Lusardi and Scheresberg
(2013) document that most high-cost borrowers display very low levels of financial literacy, that is, they lack
numeracy and do not possess knowledge of basic financial concepts. They conclude that the level of financial
literacy plays a role in explaining why so many individuals have made use of high-cost borrowing methods.
While these conclusions might be calling for increased efforts to provide financial education, the efficacy of
financial literacy programs has not yet been demonstrated convincingly (Cole et al. (2011)).
2.2 Studies of consumer characteristics and demand for rent-to-own
contracts using survey data
While studying AFS, the literature just described covers but does not really focus on the rent-to-own (RTO)
industry. Swagler and Wheeler (1989), and Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999) are the first papers to examine
the contract characteristics, consumer experience within the RTO contract, and motivation for entering into
such agreements.
Swagler and Wheeler (1989) present a description of the contract and are the fist to perform an analysis
of the cost of RTO to consumers and report the high price of the transaction. They note that, although RTO
8transactions offer immediate access to goods for a relatively low periodic payment, the total amount con-
sumers must pay to obtain ownership is high, usually two to three times the retail price of comparable goods.
They also employ survey data from 61 individuals in the West Palm Beach, Florida who had participated
in rental-purchase agreements. They conclude customers are predominantly female, with lower income and
high school education. Regarding reported reasons for going into RTO, seven out of ten survey respondents
indicated that being able to get the product right away was one of the most important reasons for partici-
pation. The fact that no credit check was involved was also frequently listed among respondents. The low
monthly payments and the ability to quit at any time were also listed as attractive contract characteristics.
Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999) performed 153 interview surveys in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to
explore in more detail the determinants of rent-to-own demand. They consider RTO demand an anomaly
taking “the exorbitant cost of using rental-purchase methods” into account. They conclude households are
more likely to use rent-to-own contracts when they face uncertain or unstable levels of disposable income
and when they report difficulties managing their finances over the longer term.
The two early studies of RTO just described are drawn exclusively from low-income populations, which is
not necessarily representative of the population making use of RTO contracts at large. Sample size is also a
serious consideration in both studies. Sixty one and 153 observations are used in these papers. Their survey
data is also of questionable quality: the reader of these papers has no idea of the extent of the bias generated
by nonresponse. This is a problem for almost every survey as it arises from the fact that there are usually
differences between the ideal sample pool of respondents and the sample that actually responds to a survey.
According to Weisberg, Krosnick and Bowen (1989), in the 1950s it was not unusual for survey researchers
to obtain response rates of 90 percent. Now, however, people are not as trusting of interviewers and response
rates are much lower. Nonresponse bias usually cannot be avoided and so inevitably negatively affects most
survey research by creating errors in a statistical measurement. Researchers must therefore account for
nonresponse either during the planning of their survey or during the analysis of their survey results. Swagler
and Wheeler (1989) do not even give the reader an idea of the magnitude of this problem in their work, they
simply state that people were “asked to take part in the survey” and that their final sample consisted of 61
individuals. The same issue is present in Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999), who report 153 interviews were
successfully conducted but do no reveal the number of individuals who where initially approached. Finally,
another problem present in many surveys is that it may be hard for participants to recall information or
to tell the truth about a controversial question. Respondents may not feel comfortable providing answers
that present themselves in an unfavorable way. This is particularly important in the context of alternative
financial services. Some individuals may be reluctant to admit to potential embarrassments, such as having
been denied credit or having signed a contract he or she did not understand.
9The Federal Trade Commission, on the other hand, performed the largest and most representative survey
of RTO customers. Most of the issues present in survey studies were carefully addressed in this project.
In this nationwide, individual-level survey, the data were collected from December 1998 to February 1999.
Twelve thousand randomly selected households were interviewed of which 532 had used RTO within the last
five years. Lacko, McKernan and Hastak (2002) study these interviews and conclude RTO customers are
more likely to be African American, younger, less educated, have lower incomes, have children, rent their
residence, live in the South, and live in nonsuburban areas. Surprisingly, they find that 85% of rent-to-
own customer households owned a car or truck, 44% had a credit card, 49% had a savings account, and
64% had a checking account. On reported contract use, they find that most (67%) RTO customers entered
the transaction intending to purchase and most (70%) purchased indeed. As a result, the authors suggest
that total cost and other terms of the purchase should be provided on product labels and in agreements.
The authors also suggest that careful analysis should be undertaken before adopting policies that would
substantially limit availability of RTO transactions because 75% of RTO customers are satisfied with their
experience. Nineteen percent of RTO customers were dissatisfied, with the major complaint being about
high prices.
Despite being the most comprehensive study of RTO consumer characteristics, intentions and behavior,
Lacko, McKernan and Hastak (2002) still rely on survey data. Reported behavior and intentions very often
differ from actual decisions. Subsequent work using micro-level data help paint a clearer picture of actual
consumer behavior in the context of RTO.
2.3 Reduced-form studies of rent-to-own demand with micro-level
data
The first two articles to make use of store transaction-level data are Anderson and Jackson (2004) and An-
derson and Jaggia (2009). The former collected transactional data from 100 stores in 46 states in the United
States including 57 Rent-A-Centers and 43 other RTO stores. They work with 352,646 raw transactional
records, 95 percent of which correspond to the period 1998-2001. In the case of the latter, the dataset was
drawn from four stores of a small RTO chain with stores in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi. They work
with 7,517 observations, which originated between the years 2000 and 2002. Both datasets were gathered
with the cooperation of the Association of Progressive Rental Organizations (APRO), the industry trade
group.
In their paper, Anderson and Jackson (2004) present descriptive statistics of RTO contract outcomes to
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try to derive conclusions on contract use. They find that over 51% of the agreements in their data result
in the merchandise being returned and 48% with the goods remaining with the customer. Most of the
purchases (56%) come through early purchase. Because only 12% of all agreements end with the customer
paying to term, the authors conclude that the interest rate consumers are charged when renting to term is
not the most useful information for customers. Instead, RTO contracts should provide the purchase price at
different points in time, that is, the price resulting from exercising the early purchase option. The authors
reject the scenario that a significant number of RTO customers are forced to return merchandise despite
making scheduled payments nearly to the term of the RTO contract. They find that 90% of returns occur
with less than 36% of the scheduled weekly payments made.
Anderson and Jaggia (2009), in turn, estimate a simple regression. They attempt to explain the pro-
portion of rent paid relative to total rent if the RTO contract went to term. The authors find that, in line
with Anderson and Jackson (2004), actual rent paid by RTO customers is far lower (with a median of 14.7%
of total) than the total rent customers would have paid if the contract went to term. They conclude that
this reflects, in part, that many customers either return or purchase early. While some of these returns are
“failed purchases,” others reflect short-term need. The authors state that the data also highlight significant
business risk. Unfavorable charge-offs, that is, merchandise written off as unrecoverable, are pervasive. They
represent almost 13% of total charge-offs.
Part of the work presented in chapter 4 of this dissertation consists of a study of contract outcomes based
on transaction-level data, very similar in spirit to the analysis contained in Anderson and Jackson (2004) and
Anderson and Jaggia (2009). The data for my study consists of proprietary information from a medium-sized
independent RTO chain in Ohio, with 15 stores across the state. This information was gathered without the
cooperation of the Association of Progressive Rental Organizations. For the analysis I consider 10,103 items
purchased by the firm in a one year period around April 2008.
I exploit the data to study aspects of RTO that have not been analyzed before, including the transaction-
level performance of RTO firms. I think of the firm as investing in various durable goods and selling contracts
on them to consumers to understand what the rate of return on this activity is and what the factors that
affect this rate of return are.
Most importantly, the analysis contained in chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation is also the first piece
of work on the RTO industry to employ structural estimation techniques, and therefore the first to credibly
analyze the consequences of contract changes, regulatory changes and other counterfactual exercises on social
welfare.
The structural methodology I employ allows me to account for various factors that affect consumer
behavior in the context of RTO that simply cannot be controlled for in static regression models. To begin
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with, the model I develop and estimate is dynamic, a very important assumption considering RTO consumers
make decisions multiple times during the life of the contract, and taking into account the fact that the
agreement contains several financial options with a value that changes with time. A dynamic model is
an adequate tool to reveal time-dependent patterns of consumer behavior. Consumers in my model, for
instance, each period can decide whether to make a rental payment, exercise the early payout option, return
the item to the store, or run away with the good. This way of modeling consumer choice leads to much richer
predictions than simple summary statistics or OLS regressions. In addition, I account for the high degree
of labor income risk faced by RTO customers by allowing their income process to be subject to shocks and
evolve stochastically.
It becomes clear, then, that estimating a structural model is helpful to answer a broader set of questions
than those addressed in the existing literature. Instead of describing contract outcomes, I attempt to
understand the incentives and trade-offs individuals face, and how these lead to contract outcomes. This
way of thinking about the problem allows me to understand how contract changes can ultimately impact
social welfare in the industry.
2.4 Structural models with micro-level data
In structural models, agents are forward looking and maximize expected intertemporal payoffs. The param-
eters to be estimated are structural in the sense that they describe agents’ preferences and beliefs about
technological and institutional constraints. Under the principle of revealed preference, these parameters are
estimated using microdata on individuals’ choices and outcomes. Thus an attractive feature of this literature
is that structural parameters have a transparent interpretation within the theoretical model that frames the
empirical investigation. Moreover, econometric models in this class are useful tools for the evaluation of
counterfactual policies.
Seminal papers that develop and estimate discrete choice dynamic programming models of individual
behavior include Wolpin (1984) on fertility and child mortality, Miller (1984) on job matching and occu-
pational choice, Pakes (1986) on patent renewal, and Rust (1987) on machine replacement. For the most
recent survey of dynamic discrete choice structural models, the reader is referred to Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2010).
This is a growing field due to the increased availability of detailed microdata in recent years. These
data provide a good input to test and apply the large theoretical literature on pricing and contract design.
Another well-known impediment to the development of this literature has been the computational complexity
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number of interesting applications of these models to different areas in economics.
In chapter 5, I estimate a single-agent, finite-horizon, dynamic discrete choice model with persistent
unobserved heterogeneity. I found motivation in models of retirement from the labor force such as Rust and
Phelan (1997) and Karlstrom, Palme and Svensson (2004). In these models, the individual makes the choice
of whether to retire each year for a finite number of years, say from age 50 to age 70, when retirement is
mandatory.
To deal with the problem of persistent unobservables, I build on the work of Pakes (1986) on patent
renewal cited earlier1 , Keane and Wolpin (1997) studying the occupational choice and the career decisions
of young men, Wang (2012) analyzing the effects of sugar sweetened soft drinks taxes on consumption and
welfare, and theoretical results from Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2006) where particle filtering
techniques are applied to deal with persistent unobservable shocks.
Another problem encountered during the estimation of the structural discrete choice model in the context
of RTO was one of initial conditions. Simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic, nonlinear
panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity are presented in Heckman (1981) and more recently in
Wooldridge (2005).
Finally, I rely on the work of Magnac and Thesmar (2002). The authors analyze the identification of
dynamic discrete choice models. Using Bellman equations as moment conditions (based on the insight of
Hotz and Miller (1993)), they show that in general dynamic discrete choice models are nonparametrically
underidentified, without knowledge of the discount factor and the distribution of the unobserved shocks.
2.4.1 Structural models in the context of alternative financial services
My work naturally relates to the literature applying structural estimation techniques in the context of various
alternative financial services industries. No paper, however, has been written to date on rent-to-own.
In the context of payday loans, Skiba and Tobacman (2008) estimate a structural dynamic programming
model that includes features like liquidity constraints and stochastic income, and incorporate institutionally
realistic payday loans, default opportunities, and generalizations of the discount function. They recover
deep parameters using the method of simulated moments. They conclude the estimates provide suggestive
evidence that quasi-hyperbolic discounting models perform better than the exponential model at explaining
payday borrowing, repayment, and default. They do not run, however, any counterfactual simulations in
their paper.
A structural supply side model to study the competitiveness of the payday lending market in Colorado is
1Pakes’ paper was also one the first econometric applications to use Monte Carlo simulation techniques to approximate
high-dimensional integrals, methodology I also employ in my work.
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developed by Wu (2008). He shows that while lenders enjoy large profit margins at the loan level, this may
be driven away when store- and business-level fixed costs are spread onto individual transactions.
Ruiz (2010) builds a dynamic model of household choices to study how the entry of a mainstream bank
into municipalities that were previously unserved by this type of institution changes consumers’ saving, credit
and consumption patterns. She finds that in the regions where the bank entered, households were better
able to smooth their consumption, even though the overall proportion of households who save went down.
These results suggest that the use of savings as a buffer on income fluctuations declines once formal credit
is available.
Finally, Einav, Jenkins and Levine (2012) develop an empirical model of the demand for automobile fi-
nanced purchases that incorporates both adverse selection and repayment incentives. The model is estimated
using detailed transaction-level data on subprime auto loans from the buy-here-pay-here industry. The goal
of their exercise is to show how different elements of loan contracts affect the quality of the borrower pool
and subsequent loan performance. One of their main findings is the central role that down payment require-
ments play in limiting loan originations and constraining borrower leverage. Their estimates show that even
modestly relaxing these requirements can greatly expand and increase the riskiness of the borrower pool.
Their estimates also reveal a high value to innovations in credit scoring that allow offers to be based on the
observed riskiness of loan applicants.
Einav, Jenkins and Levine (2012) has become one of the most cited papers in recent years studying
subprime credit markets. Their work has inspired me to dive into the alternative financial services world.
For that reason I will now take a moment to compare their paper to the work presented in chapters 5 and 6
of this dissertation.
It is clear that both Einav, Jenkins and Levine (2012) and myself study two financial services industries
that target low-income customers, with poor to no credit history and little access to savings. We both study
contract design and are ultimately interested in understanding the impact of contract changes on outcomes
and welfare. With that goal in mind, however, we exploit differences sources of variation and employ different
econometric techniques.
The main source of heterogeneity used in Einav, Jenkins and Levine (2012) is the presence of risk-based
pricing in subprime auto loan contracts, that is, the variation in contract terms across consumers. They
assess the role of contract pricing in screening high-risk borrowers and limiting defaults. In the context of
RTO, on the other hand, contract terms are identical across consumers, that is, pricing is independent of
creditworthiness. I instead exploit the existent heterogeneity in product categories and the time variation in
consumer behavior generated by the flexibility of the RTO contract in terms of the of the early return and
early purchase options.
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Regarding methodology, the central empirical approached employed in Einav, Jenkins and Levine (2012)
is not strictly structural. They do not parameterize and estimate the primitive elements of a consumer
optimization model. Instead, they make functional form assumptions they state are more closely related to
the observed outcomes and derive a set of linear estimating equations from a specific model of consumer
optimization. My approach is, on the other hand, to try to recover the primitive elements of a consumer
optimization model, which is computationally intensive. The techniques presented in chapters 5 and 6 of
this dissertation resemble those contained in Appendix A to their paper.
2.5 Summary of contributions
As is evident from the discussion presented in this chapter, my work on rent-to-own ties together with
several literatures in industrial organization, starting with pioneering studies of alternative financial services,
analyses of consumer characteristics and demand for rent-to-own contracts using survey data, reduced-form
studies of rent-to-own demand with micro-level data, and structural models with transaction-level data,
especially those in the context of alternative financial services.
In terms of the contributions to these literatures, this dissertation contains the most detailed analysis
of the RTO contract, the industry’s institutional details and its regulatory framework. I build on the
analysis presented in previous papers and combine it with multiple new sources of information. I include
data from the industry’s official trade association, and regulatory bodies from different states. I have also
performed visits to several RTO stores, conducted interviews with industry participants, and got access
to relevant proprietary documentation, including forms used to perform customer screening, actual RTO
contract sheets and payment receipts. I answer questions that have not been addressed in previous papers.
For instance, I provide facts on the cost of RTO to consumer and compare this cost to that of competing
contractual arrangements to understand whether RTO is expensive in a relative sense and for the particular
population making use of the contract. I also examine the performance of RTO companies and contrast it
to that of firms in other industries and competing companies to study whether firms in the industry are
overwhelmingly profitable.
This dissertation also includes the first study of RTO using micro-level data that has not been commis-
sioned by the industry. I not only analyze contract outcomes, as previous papers using micro-level data
have done. I also study aspects of RTO that have not been analyzed before, including the transaction-level
performance of RTO firms. For example, I think of the firm as investing in various durable goods and selling
contracts on them to consumers to understand what the rate of return on this activity is and what the factors
that affect this rate of return are.
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This dissertation also contains the first piece of work on the RTO industry to employ structural estimation
techniques, and therefore the first to credibly analyze the consequences of contract changes, regulatory
changes and other counterfactual exercises on social welfare. This is the main contribution of my dissertation,
which helps fill an important gap in the literature. I develop and estimate a structural model that helps
us understand the incentives and trade-offs individuals face in the context of RTO, and how these impact
contract outcomes. The estimated model is used to run “what if” scenarios to analyze contract design. I
show that there are a number of contract changes RTO firms can introduce to increase consumer satisfaction
and firm performance simultaneously. In particular, I perform various experiments based upon the estimated
model to answer three central research questions involving the early return option, the early purchase option
and the delinquency option.
A proper understanding of the RTO market is essential to assess the value of the transaction to consumers
and firms, as well as to design sensible regulatory frameworks. I hope my dissertation helps resolve the
controversies surrounding the industry, acts as a guide to the RTO world, and promotes constructive policy
discussions.
As much as I intend to contribute to the literature with a much better understanding of the RTO
marketplace, there are many more questions on the industry that still need to be addressed, as listed in
chapter 7. Many questions remain in the context of a large, interesting, and severely under studied industry.





Descriptive Analysis of the Contract and
the Industry
3.1 Introduction
The focus of this dissertation is on rent-to-own (RTO) stores. Due to its unique nature, the RTO agreement
is a very attractive contract to study. It is a lease-purchase agreement different from a plain rental contract
and a credit sale. As will become clear in this chapter, what distinguishes the RTO agreement from a plain
rental contract is that the customer has the option to purchase the item, either through renting to term or
exercising an early buyout option. Customers can also terminate the contract at any time, for any reason,
without further obligation, therefore not being subject to a fixed-term lease contract. What distinguishes
the RTO agreement from a credit sale is, in fact, the absence of traditional credit. No credit check is
performed at the initiation of the contract, and the agreement can be terminated by the customer without
credit consequences.
The industry serves more than six million Americans each year and operates 9,800 storefronts in all 50 U.S.
states and Canada, generating over US$ 8.5 billion in revenues and employing more than 50,000 individuals1.
It has grown considerably since its inception in the early 1960s and has drawn significant attention recently
from regulators and consumer advocacy groups. At the heart of the debate is the ostensibly high price of
1Association of Progressive Rental Organization, http://www.rtohq.org/(last visited May 17, 2013) [hereinafter APRO
(2013)].
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the RTO transaction, and the allegedly overwhelming profitability of RTO stores2. Studying RTO contracts
is particularly relevant at a time when the United States Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is being
established and assigned increasing levels of responsibility by the Obama administration3, and when the
number of unbanked or underbanked Americans, who rely on alternative financial services providers, is
steadily growing4.
By reading this chapter, the reader will acquire a deep understanding of the characteristics of rent-to-own
contracts and the key components of the industry. Some of the questions I answer along the way are: What
is RTO? What makes the contract unique? Is RTO expensive to consumers? Who are the main market
participants? What do customers look like and how do they behave? What do firms look like and how do
they perform?
As described in chapter 2, the RTO industry has been relatively unexplored in academic settings. Every
academic article on RTO contains a brief description of the contract and the industry. In this chapter, I
build on the analysis presented in these papers and combine it with multiple other sources of information.
I include data from the industry’s official trade association, and regulatory bodies from different states. I
have also performed visits to several RTO stores, conducted interviews with industry participants, and got
access to relevant documentation, including forms used to perform customer screening, actual RTO contract
sheets and payment receipts. To the best of my knowledge, this chapter contains the most detailed analysis
of the rent-to-own contract, the industry’s institutional details and its regulatory framework to date.
A brief discussion on the interviews with industry participants is due at this point. These were conducted
between March 21st and March 23rd of 2011, at five different RTO stores belonging to both Aaron’s, one of the
two publicly traded firms in the industry, and a medium-sized independent chain in Ohio. For confidentiality
purposes, I will keep the names of the interviewees anonymous. I interviewed the president and founder, the
marketing manager, an account manager and a district manager of the independent chain, as well as a sales
manager of Aaron’s. The structure of the interviews was based on the McKinsey interviewing methodology,
as presented in Rasiel (1999), technique developed for consultants who need to get up to speed on unfamiliar
industries. My interview plan consisted of a set of open-ended questions on the demand and supply sides of
the industry. The list of questions can be found in tables A3.1 and A3.2 in the appendix.
This chapter is structured as follows. I start by studying the characteristics of the RTO agreement
2Saunders (1997), Martin and Huckins (1997), Anderson and Jackson (2001), White and Schneiderman (2012), National
Consumer Law Center (2013).
3The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) established the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). In January of 2012, President Barack Obama appointed Rich Cordray to be the first
Director of the CFPB. The agency’s role is to give consumers the information they need to understand the terms of their
agreements with financial companies. They work to make regulations and guidance as clear and streamlined as possible so




in section 3.2, the different contract terms and the various services and financial options included in the
contract. From the point of view of a consumer who wants to access durable goods, I compare the cost of
RTO to that of competing contractual arrangements to address the question of whether RTO is expensive.
I present a discussion on how appropriate the use of implicit interest rates to assess the cost of RTO to
consumers is.
The structure of the RTO industry is characterized in section 3.3, where I describe in detail the character-
istics of the consumers and the firms involved in this market. The industry is heavily exposed to regulatory
risk, and is currently subject to restrictions imposed at the federal and state levels. Section 3.4 presents a
comprehensive account of RTO legislation. Concluding remarks can be found in section 3.5.
3.2 What is Rent-to-Own?
The RTO agreement provides consumers immediate access to new or second-hand goods such as home
electronics, personal computers, furniture, appliances and even car wheels and tires, without a credit check
or down payment. In a typical RTO transaction, an agreement is written for a period of 6 to 36 months, with
the most common maturities lying between 12 and 24 months. The merchandise is delivered immediately
and rental payments are made weekly, bi-weekly or monthly. At the end of each period, a consumer can
continue to rent by paying for an additional period, or can return the good to the store without further
obligation. The product can be returned at any time for any reason. Consumers obtain ownership of the
good by renting to term or through early payment of a pre-specified cash price. The latter is called the
early buyout option. If the customer returns the product during payments, some RTO chains offer her the
possibility reinstate her payment history within a specific time period. The rental fee includes delivery, setup
and service5.
Interviews with the president and founder of the independent chain revealed that some RTO firms allow
customers to modify the terms of the agreement in response to changes in their financial situation. If money
gets tighter, the customer can arrange to lower payments and extend the payment period. A customer with
a positive income shock can purchase the item outright before the agreement terminates. The consumer can
sometimes also upgrade the good, by altering the terms of the agreement without losing already-invested
equity.
The Association of Progressive Rental Organizations (APRO) is the nonprofit trade association that
represents the industry6. According to them, 39% of all RTO transaction in 2007 involved furniture items,
5Lacko, McKernan and Hastak (2002), Anderson and Jackson (2004), APRO (2013).
6According to their website: “The Association of Progressive Rental Organizations is the international voice for the rent-to-
own industry founded in 1980. APRO is the nonprofit trade association advocating and representing the rent-to-own industry
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21% electronics, 20% appliances and 9% computers. The rental of computer items has experienced impressive
growth since 2007, probably reaching today 20% of all RTO transactions. A new product category, tires and
wheels, has also been expanding rapidly, but statistics on these items are not yet available.
3.2.1 The rent-to-own process and contract terms
A typical customer hears about the RTO transaction from a friend or relative, or by means of advertising
through direct mailing or “marriage” mailing7, according to the marketing manager of the independent store.
The customer decides to walk into a RTO store that looks like a traditional furniture store. The first piece
of information the consumer encounters is the label attached to the items being offered. This provides
basic information on the terms of the lease-purchase agreement. Eighteen of the 47 U.S. states that have
passed RTO legislation regulate label content8. Most of these states require the disclosure of the term of the
contract, the rental rate and the cash price. Images of RTO stores in Ohio, as well as labels, can be found
in figure A3.1 in the appendix.
Once she has made the decision on which item she intends to take home, the consumer needs to fill in a
Lease Order Form. Based on the information contained in the latter, the RTO store decides to approve or
reject the customer. This form is therefore the main screening mechanism employed by RTO stores. All first-
time customers are required to fill out this form, including personal information, and contact information
of a number of personal references. The account manager of the independent chain I interviewed revealed
that customers who cannot provide at least two personal references able to verify the customer’s address
are not approved. Finally, prospective customers must disclose employment information, such as contact
information of employer, hire date, and the frequency of arrival of paychecks. A copy of the lease order form
can be found in figures A3.2 and A3.3 in the appendix, where the name of the chain has been hidden where
necessary for confidentiality purpose.
Conditional on approval, a Lease Purchase Agreement is signed and the customer makes the first payment.
This document is the most important record of the transaction and is considerably regulated by state laws,
as described in section 3.4. Without the use of small print and in straightforward language, it specifies
the terms of the agreement, describing what the consumer is entitled to by making the periodic payments,
contingent fees, and some restrictions on what the customer can do with the item. The different terms laid
down in this contract are:
before the U.S. Congress, Internal Revenue Service, state legislatures, the courts, media and the public.” APRO (2013).
7“Marriage” mailing, also known as pizza mailing due to its widespread use by pizza restaurants, refers to group commercial
mailing. Different retailers mail together to reduce costs.
8Association of Progressive Rental Organizations Legal Update Legal Update (2013). The reader is referred to section 3.4
in this chapter for an in depth discussion of RTO regulation.
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• Ownership option: The firm will transfer ownership of the property to the customer if the item is
rented to term or if the early purchase option is exercised. The formula governing the cost of exercising
the early purchase option is specified.
• Termination: This is a no-obligation agreement. The customer can terminate the contract at any time,
for any reason, without penalty.
• Maintenance and warranty: The firm will perform all maintenance and repairs to the property while
payments are being made. It will also provide a replacement product while the item is being repaired9.
The manufacturer’s warranty will be passed on to the consumer if she purchases the property.
• Restrictions: The customer is not allowed to pledge or pawn the item, or move it from the address
listed in the contract without written authorization from the RTO firm.
• Payment frequency: Usually weekly, bi-weekly or monthly. Chosen by the customer when the contract
is originated.
• Reinstatement: The customer may reinstate the agreement without losing any right or option under
certain conditions. Some stores offer lifetime reinstatement rights.
• Additional charges and fees: Late fees, in-home collection fees, reinstatement fees and optional damage
waiver fees are disclosed.
• Risk of loss and damage: The contract specifies who bears the cost of item misuse and damage due to
unexpected events.
Figures A3.4 and A3.5 in the appendix show a copy of the RTO contract obtained from the independent
firm in 2012, where the name of the chain has been hidden where necessary for confidentiality purpose.
At every subsequent rental payment, a receipt specifying when the next payment is due, the number of
payments made up to that date, and the number of payments remaining, is provided to the customer. Some
RTO chains also report the amount due to exercise the early purchase option in this receipt. A copy of this
receipt can also be found in the appendix, in figure A3.6.
Some customers stop making payments and refuse to return the item. Most RTO stores deal with these
issues in house, with store account managers in charge of the collection practices. Lacko, McKernan and
Hastak (2002) report that most customers are satisfied with the transactions and are treated well if they are
late making a payment. Only a small minority report abusive collection practices though some RTO firms.
9The value of this service exceeds that of the typical manufacturer’s warranty. It is comparable to the optional services
contract offered by traditional retailers for an additional fee at the time of purchase; plus the value of being provided a loaner
during repairs.
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3.2.2 Interpreting the rent-to-own contract
The debate in policy circles has often been centered on the question of whether the RTO contract should be
considered a lease or a credit sale10. There is no point in trying to force it into either of these two definitions
since the RTO contract has a unique nature. It can be understood as a bundle of services and financial
options, each of which has stand-alone value to the consumer11:
1. Services: Delivery, set-up of the item and service; absence of credit check and credit consequences of
terminating the agreement; absence of down payment; adjustable contract terms.
2. Financial Options:
(a) A put option with a zero strike price expiring at the end of each rental period.
(b) Various options to acquire a call option with a positive strike price equal to the early purchase
price.
(c) An option to acquire a call option with a zero strike price when the final payment is made.
(d) An option to re-enter the contract even after the put option described in (a) had been exercised.
(e) An option to upgrade the merchandise.
Pure lease contracts require a credit check, carry large down payments and, most importantly, lack financial
option (a) above, that is the return option. Credit sale contracts, in turn, also require a credit check, do not
include delivery and set-up costs, and lack all the financial options listed above. It should be clear, therefore,
that RTO should be interpreted and treated as a distinct contractual arrangement given its unique nature.
3.2.3 Consumer alternatives to rent-to-own contracts
A consumer who wants to get access to a durable good has a number of alternatives to choose from. The
goal of this section is to describe these alternatives and compare their cost to that of initiating a rent-to-own
contract.
The customer could walk into a retail store like Walmart or Target and pay in cash. She could also use a
credit card to make the purchase at the same retail store. Alternatively, the consumer could initiate a lease
contract. Firms like Cort and several computer manufacturers offer these contracts. 12 Finally, the customer
10Martin and Huckins (1997), Anderson and Jackson (2001), Association of Progressive Rental Organizations Legal Update
Legal Update (2013).
11This way of decomposing the RTO contract into services and financial options was first proposed by Anderson and Jackson
(2001). Here I adopt their interpretation and extend it.
12Leases are usually subject to a fixed term of six to twelve months and require monthly payments. The reader is referred to
Cort’s website for more information on this contractual arrangement: http://www.cort.com/
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could turn to a RTO store to start a lease-purchase agreement. For those consumers with the intention to
access the durable good only temporarily, leases and RTO contracts are their best options13.
When comparing RTO against pure retail transactions, the total amount of money needed to rent to
term in a RTO transaction is compared to the cash price at retail stores14. This comparison assumes a RTO
customer rents to term, which is not always the case as has been repeatedly pointed out in the literature15
and as will be shown in section 4.2.2. Customers returning the item early or exercising the early payout
option would be disbursing significantly less to access the good.
When comparing RTO to credit card purchases, annual percentage rates (APRs) of both transactions
are used. However, as will be discussed in section 3.2.4 of this chapter, implicit APRs represent an upper
bound on the cost of RTO to consumers. Due to the unique nature of the RTO contract, APRs could be
misleading.
Finally, monthly payment amounts are used to weight RTO against pure lease transactions.
Table 3.1 compares the cost to consumers of accessing different items via pure retail purchases, credit
card purchases, leases and RTO contracts16. For the reasons stated before, the reader should be careful
when interpreting the results presented in the table for the pure retail and credit card cases.
Category Item Total of Payments RTO (1)
Cash Price Pure 
Retail (2) (1)/(2) APR RTO






Appliances Estate Washer $839.79 $414.88 2.0 60.99% 18.24% $39.99 $49.90
Furniture 2-piece Sectional Sofa $1,439.82 $880.00 1.6 71.47% 18.24% $79.99 $68.00
TVs TV: 42" Plasma $1,679.79 $599.00 2.8 56.94% 18.24% $79.99 $75.00
Computers 1525 Dell Laptop $839.88 $457.82 1.8 109.04% 18.24% $69.99 $49.00
Electronics Playstation 3 $719.88 $262.87 2.7 113.98% 18.24% $59.99 n.a.
RTO vs Credit Card Purchase RTO vs Pure LeaseRTO vs Pure Retail
Table 3.1: Cost Comparison: RTO versus pure retail, credit card purchase, and pure lease. All data from
the year 2010.
The table seems to indicate that RTO agreements are more expensive than credit card purchases and
pure retail transactions. APRs implicit in RTO agreements are three to four times larger than those charged
by credit cards. And, as consumer advocate groups have repeatedly pointed out in the past17, the total
amount consumers must pay to obtain ownership of an item though RTO transactions is one and a half to
13These are the options RTO customers usually consider as alternative to RTO contracts, according to the president and
founder of the independent chain.
14The total amount of money needed to rent to term in a RTO contract is simply the periodic rental rate times the number
of periods the agreement is subject to.
15Lacko, McKernan and Hastak (2002), Anderson and Jackson (2004), APRO (2013).
16RTO information was obtained from a medium-sized independent chain in Ohio. Credit card APRs were taken from the
contract terms of the simplest credit card offered by Citibank. Pure lease costs were obtained from CORT, a Berkshire Hathaway
Company and the world’s largest provider of rental furniture; and from PCWord Magazine for the case of computers. Finally,
pure retail prices were obtained either from local discount retailers (Sears and Kmart) or online retailers (Amazon and Best
Buy). All data corresponds to the May 2011.
17Saunders (1997), Martin and Huckins (1997).
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three times the retail price of comparable goods18. Credit card and cash purchases, however, are not nearly
as flexible and convenient as RTO contracts are.
Monthly RTO payments are very close to those charged by pure lease firms. This is surprising considering
the additional flexibility offered by RTO contract, where customers can return items at any time without
penalty. In addition, lease services require a credit check and very often a credit card.
Note that the comparison assumes consumers have the necessary cash to purchase the item outright or
access to a credit card. As mentioned earlier in the paper, almost 30% of U.S. households are unbanked or
underbanked. Consumers without available funds to purchase items outright, and those without credit or
with bad credit history, may have nowhere else to turn to but RTO.
3.2.4 A discussion on pricing and implicit interest rates
As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, the RTO industry has drawn significant attention from
regulators and consumer advocacy groups. At the heart of the debate is the apparent high price of the RTO
transaction, usually measured by the implicit APR customers pay if they rent to term. Academic papers
with a critical view towards RTO use this measure to document the high cost of the transaction as well19.
The implicit APR a consumer pays when renting to term does not seem to be a good measure of the cost
of RTO contracts for a number of reasons:
1. Not all consumers rent to term. A large proportion of them exercise the early purchase option and many
turn to RTO to fulfill a short-term need and therefore return the item early20. Figure 3.1 shows the
APR consumers pay when acquiring the ownership of the item at different points in time by exercising
the early buyout option21. The example focuses on a 42” LG plasma TV offered by the independent
chain in Ohio22. Early purchase option prices have been computed according to equation 3.1, specified
in Ohio state regulation (see section 3.4.3 of this chapter). It is clear that the implicit APR a consumer
pays to acquire ownership of the good decreases the earlier the purchase option is exercised. The APR
increases as we approach the rent to term case. In this sense, APRs represent a worst-case scenario
18These numbers are in line with those presented in a other papers claiming to document the high costs of the RTO transaction
to consumers. See Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999), Kolodinsky et al. (2005).
19See footnote 18.
20There is a strong debate as to what is the proportion of consumers that end up owning the good and the fraction of them
that end up just renting it. APRO argues that approximately 75% of customers return the rented item within the first four
months, 17% exercise the early purchase option and 8% rent to full term. The FTC survey revealed that 71% of individuals
reported having purchased the item and 25% having returned it to the store. It is nonetheless clear that not all RTO customers
rent to term. Section 4.2.2 in this chapter throws light on this questions by looking at micro-level data.
21To arrive at an APR measure, I first compute the monthly internal rate of return (IRR) from acquiring an item via the
early purchase option as follows: Cash Price = p
(1+IRR)1




, where “Cash Price” is the cash price
of the item, p is the monthly rental rate, pEPOt is the early purchase option price, and t is the month at which the option is
exercised. I then translate monthly IRRs into yearly APRs as follows: APR = (1 + IRR)12 − 1.
22I have performed the same exercise for a variety of goods, ranging from electronics to furniture, to obtain the same qualitative
results. These results are available upon request.
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analysis.
2. The RTO agreement includes a bundle of services, such delivery, set-up and servicing. The value of
these should be taken into account when computing the implicit rate consumers pay for the transaction.
Figure 3.1 also shows APR computations including the value of these services. In this example, it is
assumed that the delivery of a 42” Plasma TV has a value of $50, and its set-up a value of $30.
The value of the service agreement included in the RTO contract, which exceeds that of the typical
manufacturer’s warranty, was also added to the computation. This value was calculated based on the
price of a one-year extended warranty program offered by LG23. Using this analysis, APRs are still
high, but have a more reasonable level than the 229.7% reported by Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999)
for a comparable item.
3. The flexibility of the RTO transaction and the lack of credit check are not taken into account in implicit
APR computations. RTO contracts are no-obligation, no-penalty return transactions. This has value
to most consumers. Put differently, the no-penalty return option is not usually available without
additional payment in a credit purchase. In addition, no credit check is performed on prospective RTO
customers, which is also valuable to many individuals with bad or no credit history.
4. On the other hand, the cash price used in the computation of APRs is the one charged by RTO
stores. Customers can get lower prices for the items at discount department stores such as Walmart or
Target. And as is mentioned in section 3.4 later in this chapter, dealers may have incentives to inflate
cash prices to comply with state regulation. APRs computed using RTO chain cash prices would be
underestimating the real cost of the transaction to consumers.
It is should be clear, however, that simple APRs are not the perfect measure to assess the costs of RTO
agreements. Presenting consumers with a single APR number is very deceiving, especially if the number
provided is the APR of renting to term, the worst case scenario APR. If regulators were to require RTO
firms to present APRs to consumers, some of the adjustments described above should be implemented to
overcome the limitations of this cost metric. And many APRs should be disclosed, at different points in
time, not only the rent to term APR.
23LG TVs include a one-year manufacturer warranty. I split the cost of the extended warranty evenly across the remaining
9 months of the RTO contract. When an item breaks down, the customer has to contact the RTO store instead of the
manufacturer, and loaners are provided during repairs. In the computations, I assumed this additional convenience has a value
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Figure 3.1: Implicit APR of acquiring an item through RTO.
3.3 The Market
3.3.1 Demand side
RTO companies target individuals at the base of the socioeconomic pyramid. Low income and financially
distressed consumers are attracted by the immediate access to goods for a small periodic fee and no credit
check or down payment that RTO offers. These are consumers facing a large degree of financial uncertainty.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted the most comprehensive survey on the characteristics of
the RTO customer. Between December 1998 and February 1999, 12,000 randomly selected U.S. households
were surveyed. Slightly over 500 RTO customers were identified and interviewed about their experience with
RTO stores.
The data from the survey was analyzed in in Lacko, McKernan and Hastak (2002). The authors concluded
that, compared to surveyed households that had not used RTO transactions, RTO customers were more likely
to be African American, younger, less educated, have lower incomes, have children in the household, rent
their residence, live in the South, and live in non-suburban areas.
They also found that 84% of RTO customer households owned a car, 44% had a credit card, 49% had a
savings account, and 64% had a checking account.
Interesting evidence was found on payment behavior of the surveyed RTO customers. Nearly half of them
had been late making payments. And 64% of late customers reported that the treatment they received from
the store when they were late was either “very good” or “good”. High levels of customer satisfaction were
documented in the FTC survey, with 75% of customers reporting being satisfied with their RTO experience.
Among the 19% of RTO customers reporting being dissatisfied with their experience, most cited RTO prices
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as the reason.
I combine and compare the results of the FTC survey with 1999 and 2009 RTO customer information
provided by APRO24 in figure A3.7 in the appendix. This gives the reader a comprehensive portrait of the
RTO customer.
3.3.2 Supply side
The number of RTO storefronts in the U.S. and Canada has been increasing steadily since 1997 to cross the
9,800 threshold in the year 2013. The average store has annual revenue of $736,000 and serves 360 customers
each year.
Texas, Florida, Ohio, Georgia and California have the largest number of stores and employees, and
consequently the highest value of annual wages and payroll taxes paid. Table A3.3 in the appendix shows
summary statistics for the variables mentioned above, as well as for annual revenues generated by RTO stores
across the 50 U.S. states. Table A3.4 in the appendix shows disaggregated numbers for each U.S. state25.
Market participants: Publicly held firms and independent operators
Two large public companies, Rent-A-Center (NASDAQ:RCII, 2.10B market capitalization) and Aaron’s
(NYSE:AAN, 2.115B market capitalization), together operate almost 55% of the stores in the market. They
compete, however, with an army of small and medium independent operators that has been gaining market
share. Figure A3.8 in the appendix shows the evolution of the market share of publicly traded companies
and independent operators in terms of number of stores according to APRO.
A medium-sized RTO chain operating 15 stores in Ohio has granted me access to its data. Figure A3.9
in the appendix shows the location of these 15 stores and is some evidence of the high level of competition
the firm faces from the two industry giants. The chain has been in business for almost 30 years and employs
around 100 individuals.
By December 2012, Aaron’s had 2,073 sales and lease ownership stores, comprised of 1,324 company-
operated stores and 749 independently owned franchised stores. Annual revenues totaled $2.223 billion in
201226.
Rent-A-Center (RAC) is the largest player in the RTO market. By December 2012, the company operated
2,990 company-owned stores in the U.S., including 41 pure retail installment stores27. The company also




27see Wisconsin court ruling in section 3.4.4 of this chapter.
27
money transfer services in certain existing stores. Annual revenues totaled $3.08 billion in 2012. In 2006
RAC’s market share increased significantly due to the acquisition of Rent-Way, which had previously been
the third largest publicly held company. The Federal Trade Commission approved RAC’s acquisition of
Rent-Way chain, indicating that under antitrust rules, the market was competitive28.
Competition
From within the industry: Competition forces from inside the industry are strong. In each city, inde-
pendents compete for customers with stores owned by the two industry giants.
Firms seem to compete for business in a variety of ways. In an interviews with the district manager
of the independent firm it was emphasized that personal relationships are of paramount importance in this
business. Most transactions are performed in-store, so firms gain or lose significant business through the
relationship they develop with customers. Evidence on this is that large firms like RAC impose non-compete
agreements on store employees, fearing they will take customers with them as they go to work elsewhere.
Even while employing these mechanisms, RAC seems to be having trouble retaining talent at the store level.
This may be an explanation for why independents are gaining market share and are standing up to the power
of RAC and Aaron’s.
Other variables that drive competition are the variety of goods available, as well as the refurbishing
standards of previously leased merchandise. Last but not least, firms compete in price and their ability to
adjust payment plans to consumer needs.
From outside the industry: RTO firms also face competitive forces from outside the industry.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, for some RTO customers, credit card purchases are an option. The
founder of the independent chain mentioned that long periods of loose credit standards could have a negative
impact on their business. When credit was expanded during the late 1990s and the 2000s, with interest rates
on the 15%-25% range, the RTO industry was negatively affected.
Different types of retailers are also natural competitors to RTO stores. Discount department stores such
as Walmart and Target represent a good alternative for many RTO consumers. Both those in a better
socioeconomic situation and those who benefit from a positive income shock, including a tax refund, will
probably choose to buy from discount retailers over RTO stores.
Retail establishments run by charitable organizations to raise money, commonly known as thrift stores -
examples are the Salvation Army and Volunteers of America - also compete with RTO firms. Despite being
in decline, credit furniture houses also impose some threat to the industry under study.
Finally, since they target the same population of consumers, other fringe products such as payday loans,
28Rent-A-Center (2013).
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check-cashing outlets and pawn shops are natural competitors to RTO contracts. An individual without
enough cash to purchase a household item at a standard retail store could, for instance, obtain a payday
loan and use the proceeds to acquire the merchandise. The reader is referred to Czerwonko and Sun (2013)
for a comparison of the cost of various alternative financial services.
Industry profitability
Consumer advocates repeatedly characterize the RTO activity as “overwhelmingly profitable” 29. This section
attempts to give the reader an idea of how profitable RTO firms are. For that purpose I compare the
performance of publicly traded RTO companies with that of firms in other industries and companies that
could be considered competitors. I focus the analysis on publicly traded firms due to the difficulty to obtain
and unreliability of private firm records.
I will employ two widely used measures of firm performance to carry out the described comparison. All
numbers in this section correspond to end of year 2012. The first measure is net profit margin, which allows
us to gain insight into how well a company generates and retains money. It is computed as the amount of net
income generated by a company as a percentage of revenue. This ratio enables profitability to be compared
across companies with significant differences in size and scale, and even across different industries.
An alternative ratio, return on equity, is also presented. This is the amount of net income returned as a
percentage of shareholders equity; it measures a corporation’s profitability by revealing how much profit a
company generates with the money shareholders have invested. It is generally used to assess the performance
of financial firms. Since the RTO activity certainly has a financial component, it is worth presenting this
measure as well.
In figure 3.2, I present the distribution of the average net profit margin across U.S. industries. The
vertical red lines illustrate the profit margin of the two RTO publicly traded firms: Aaron’s and RAC. Of
all U.S. industries, 52.80% of them have higher profit margins than RAC and 41.70% larger than Aaron’s.
The figure also compares RTO firms to a list of competitors. Firms like Bed Bath and Beyond or The Home
Depot present profit margins at least as high as those of the publicly traded RTO firms. A very similar
picture emerges when I present the analysis using return on equity in figure 3.3.
I conclude that, at least for publicly traded firms, there is no evidence that the RTO activity is over-
whelmingly profitable. The performance of the RTO firms evaluated stands roughly in the median of the
distribution of performance across industries. And firms that could be considered competitors perform
significantly better than RTO firms.
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Figure 3.2: Net profit margins for for 215 U.S.
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Figure 3.3: Return on equity for 100 U.S. in-
dustries and competitors. Sources: Aswath
Damodaran NYU’s webpage and Yahoo Finance
(2013).
3.4 Regulation
Industry participants are highly exposed to regulatory risk. According to the industry association, an
average of 25 bills that directly affect the RTO industry are introduced per year at the state and federal
levels of government30. Different consumer groups, such as the National Consumer Law Center, joined
the regulatory initiative and have targeted the RTO sector by endorsing specific legislation and conducting
consumer awareness campaigns31.
Different aspects of the RTO agreement are currently subject to regulation. Examples are laws regulating
the disclosure of certain pieces of information by rental-purchase dealers, price restrictions, regulation of
collection practices and regulation of reinstatement rights.
In order to provide the reader with a comprehensive account of the current state of RTO legislation, a
description of federal and state level regulation is presented next.
30Association of Progressive Rental Organizations Legal Update Legal Update (2013).
31White and Schneiderman (2012), National Consumer Law Center (2013), Consumer Federation of America (2013).
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3.4.1 Regulation at the federal level
The RTO transaction is one of the most widely used consumer transactions undefined at the federal level. In
particular, it is not considered a credit transaction or a lease, and therefore it is not subject to laws such as
the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA)32, Consumer Leasing Act (CLA)33, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act and Fair Credit Reporting Act.
As was pointed out earlier in the chapter, the debate in policy circles has often been centered on the
question of whether the RTO contract should be considered a lease or a credit sale. Proposed anti-RTO
regulation has attempted to define the RTO agreement as a credit sale. This would subject RTO contracts to
any limit states place on interest, fees or finance charges in connection with a credit sale or retail installment
sale34.
To give the reader an idea of how binding this would be, 29 states currently impose finance charge limits
that fall somewhere between 8% and 30%35. Section 3.2.4 showed how implicit APRs on RTO transactions
are almost always above that level.
Naturally, the industry association, which represents RTO stores before the U.S. Congress and state
legislatures, wants to prevent states from applying their credit laws and usury limits to RTO transactions.
APRO has endorsed regulation that would require disclosures in advertising, in store price tags, in catalogues,
and in contracts; as well as regulation that protects consumers’ right to reinstate an agreement after failing
to make a timely payment. Legislation prohibiting certain provisions in rental-purchase contracts, such as
confession-of-judgment clauses that prevent consumers from defending any legal action brought under the
contract, has also been supported by APRO36.
The evolution of federal regulation over time is presented in figure A3.10 in the appendix. It becomes
clear from the graph that attempts to regulate the industry at the federal level date back to as early as
1979. The latest anti-RTO regulatory attempt was a Senate bill called the Rent-to-Own Reform Act of
32Under the Truth in Lending Act, consumers must receive disclosure of the key costs and terms of credit transactions before
they become obligated for the extension of credit. Consumers receive disclosures that include the amount of credit extended
(known as the amount financed), the cost of credit expressed as a dollar amount (the finance charge) and as an annual percentage
rate (APR), the total amount the consumer will pay, and a payment schedule showing the timing and amount of each payment.
For more information the reader is referred to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6500-200.html
33Under the Consumer Leasing Act, consumers receive federally mandated disclosures concerning the cost of the transaction
prior to entering into the lease. These disclosures include a description of the leased property, an itemization of any up-front
payments, a payment schedule showing the amount of each periodic payment, a listing of any other charges the consumer will
have to pay, and the total of payments that the consumer will have paid by the end of the lease. There are also disclosures
regarding early termination charges, late payment fees, property maintenance responsibilities, and the consumer’s options for
purchasing the property. For more information the reader is referred to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6500-
2000.html
34More recent regulatory attempts have tried to make RTO agreements subject to these same limits but defining the RTO
transaction as a unique transaction and not a credit sale. This is because by 1993, 35 states (see figure A3.10) had enacted
RTO status that distinguished RTO from credit or installment sales, and overruling all these enactments would have made the
federal government look heavy-handed.
35Skiba, Bos and Carter (2012).
36APRO (2013).
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2007, promoted by New York Senator Charles Schumer, that did not take off37. The industry, represented
by APRO, continually seeks federal legislation. The latest APRO endorsed RTO regulation is the Consumer
Rental Purchase Agreement Act which was assigned to a congressional committee on April 15, 2013 and
intends to assure meaningful disclosures of the terms of rental-purchase agreements and to provide certain
substantive rights to consumers under these agreements38.
3.4.2 Regulation at the state level
There has been a dichotomy between federal and state RTO regulation. At the same time that attempts to
legislate the RTO industry out of business took place in the U.S. Congress, states were passing regulation
that defined the RTO contract in a manner similar to a lease and not a credit sale. It is for this reason that
state laws have generally been supported by the industry.
Forty-seven states currently have RTO laws that regulate the RTO transaction39. The statutes corre-
sponding to the different states are reasonably similar to each other. Most of them specify contract disclo-
sures, advertising disclosures, in-store price tag disclosures, restrictions on fees, and reinstatement rights.
Vermont does not regulate RTO transactions as credit sales, but does require disclosure of the effective APR.
For a very thorough and clear listing of the specific rules and regulations in place in the 47 states, the reader
is referred to the Association of Progressive Rental Organizations Legal Update Legal Update (2013). Figure
A3.10 in the appendix shows the evolution in the number of states with RTO laws. This number has been
rapidly increasing from 1993 to 2001.
3.4.3 Ohio regulation: The Ohio statute (1988)
Since the dataset was drawn from a medium RTO chain in Ohio, the paper now characterizes existing
regulation in that state.
In Ohio, the definition of a “Lease-Purchase Agreement” applies only to personal property used for
personal, family or household purposes. It does not include a lease for agricultural, business, or commercial
purposes, a lease of a motor vehicle, money or intangible property, or a lease made to an organization.
The statute puts forth the following restrictions40:
Contract disclosures: Agreements must include a description of the leased property, emphasizing
whether the property is new, used or previously leased. It must be mentioned that the consumer is not
required to purchase insurance for the property from any insurer owned or controlled by the lease-purchase
37http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-s1530
38http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1551.
39Exceptions are Wisconsin, New Jersey and North Carolina (APRO (2013)).
40http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/1351
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firm. The following notice must also be placed in the contract: “Notice: This lease-purchase agreement is
regulated by state law and may be enforced by the attorney general or by private legal action.”
In-store price tag disclosures: All property displayed or offered under a lease-purchase agreement
must carry a tag displaying the cash price of the property, the amount of the lease payment and the total
number of lease payments necessary to acquire ownership of the property.
Advertisement disclosures: Pieces of advertising must lay down the same information as in-store
price tag disclosures.








where i indexes the monthly or weekly payments, n refers to the number of those identical payments, and
“Cahs Price” is the price the RTO store would charge for the same item in a pure retail transaction41.
Restrictions on early buyout option: At any time after the initial payment, a lessee may acquire
ownership of the property by paying an amount equal to the sum by which the cash price of the leased
property exceeds fifty percent of all lease payments made by the lessee





where t denotes the number of payments made by the lessee and pEPOt denotes the early purchase option
price.
Reinstatement rights and grace period: A consumer who fails to make timely payments has the
right to reinstate the original lease-purchase agreement within three lease terms after the expiration of
the lease term. The RTO firm has to provide the customer with either the same property leased prior to
reinstatement or substitute property that is of comparable quality and condition. In addition, the statute
defines a grace period of two days for weekly payments and five days for monthly payments.
3.4.4 Unfavorable court rulings
Courts in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and New Jersey have ruled that RTO transactions are credit sales and
should therefore be subject to state laws governing credit sales42.
41This restriction may not be excessively binding since dealers are able to inflate cash prices to comply with it. As long as
the proportion of RTO store revenue that comes from pure retail transactions is small, dealers would have incentives to do so.
This is also an argument against APR disclosures: APRs would become unreliable if dealers could inflate cash prices in order
to understate the disclosed APR. On the other hand, RTO chains generally try to avoid setting high cash prices since that may
generate a feeling of mistrust on consumers towards the whole RTO transaction.
42Hill, Ramp and Silver (1998), Hastak (2004).
33
Minnesota: Although Minnesota has a state RTO statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that
RTO transactions are credit sales and should be governed by the state’s usury cap, which has been set at an
annual percentage rate of 8%.
New Jersey: In 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that RTO products are really credit
sales. The state’s 30% criminal usury cap on interest rates, for instance, would apply to RTO transactions.
The court made several critical empirical assumptions about the RTO industry: that customers always intend
to obtain ownership of good, that customers do not value the ability to cancel their rental agreements, and
that the goods that RTO stores rent out are necessities of life.
Wisconsin: In 1999, the attorney general’s office of Wisconsin sued Rent-A-Center for violating the
Wisconsin Consumer Act. The parties settled in 2002. The settlement required Rent-A-Center to disclose
annual percentage rates to consumers. Rent-a-Center converted its 23 Wisconsin stores to simple sale
retailers.
3.5 Conclusion
What makes the study of RTO contracts interesting is the unique nature of the agreement. Neither a credit
sale nor a pure lease, this contract is the cornerstone of a market that is large in size.
Consumer advocacy groups are skeptical about the value to consumers of RTO, at the very least. They
have emphasized the high cost of RTO merchandise to consumers, and the disproportionate profitability of
RTO stores. The industry association, in turn, points out that RTO is one of the most flexible transactions
in the marketplace and fervently denies consumer advocates’ accusations. It states that only RTO contracts
offer the consumer the flexibility of a no-obligation, no-penalty return transaction that provides an ownership
option.
A proper understanding of the RTO market is essential to assess the value of the transaction to consumers
and firms, as well as to design sensible regulatory frameworks. The study of RTO becomes especially relevant
at a time where regulators are increasing their scrutiny over financial services providers, and the United States
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is being established and assigned increasing levels of responsibility
under the Obama administration. In addition, the use of lease-purchase agreements has been growing rapidly
in the real estate sector after the housing crash. Understanding RTO agreements in the current setting may
help us understand the advantages and disadvantages of employing this type of contract in real estate
contexts.
This chapter analyzes the characteristics of RTO contracts and key components of the industry. I describe
the nature of the agreement and present it as a unique bundle of services and financial options, not available
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together in other contractual arrangements. I find that while RTO looks expensive compared to cash retail
and credit sale transactions, it does not when benchmarked against pure leases. One has to be very careful,
however, when making these cost comparisons since they implicitly assume the RTO consumers intends to
own the item. A large proportion of RTO consumers do not end up owning the item and use the contract
to satisfy a short-term need. For similar reasons I show that simple APRs are not the perfect measure to
assess the costs of RTO agreements and should be interpreted very carefully. I present evidence that the
RTO activity does not seem to be overwhelmingly profitable; the performance of publicly traded RTO firms
stands roughly in the median of the distribution of performance across industries in the U.S.
This chapter also describes the existing RTO regulation. I conclude there is an apparent dichotomy
between federal and state RTO regulation. At the same time that attempts to legislate the RTO industry
out of business took place in the U.S. Congress, states were passing regulation that defined the RTO contract
in a manner similar to a lease and not a credit sale, that is, relatively “friendly” RTO legislation.
The reader is encouraged to turn to chapter 4, where I analyze proprietary microdata of RTO transactions





(a) Images of RTO stores. Ohio, March 2011.
(b) RTO contract label. Obtained from Aaron’s store
in Ohio, March 2011. It displays the contract term,
the rental rate, and the cash price. In big bold letters
the label also clarifies the item being offered is new.
Figure A3.1: Images of RTO stores and labels.
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Figure A3.2: Example of rental order form obtained from independent store in 2011. The name of the chain
has been hidden where necessary for confidentiality reasons.
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Figure A3.3: Example of rental order form obtained from independent store in 2011 (cont.). The name of
the chain has been hidden where necessary for confidentiality reasons.
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Figure A3.4: Example of RTO contract obtained from independent store in 2011. The name of the chain
has been hidden where necessary for confidentiality reasons.
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Figure A3.5: Example of RTO contract obtained from independent store in 2011 (cont.). The name of the
chain has been hidden where necessary for confidentiality reasons.
40
Figure A3.6: Example of RTO receipt obtained from independent store in 2011. The name of the chain and
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Figure A3.8: Market share in terms of number of stores. Source: APRO (2013).
Figure A3.9: Location of Independent Chain (RED), Aaron’s (BLUE) and Rent-A-Center (GREEN), near
Columbus, OH.
43


























































































































Number of States that Passed RTO Regulation 
Total in 2011: 47!!
Figure A3.10: Evolution of state and federal legislation. (-) means anti-RTO legislation. (+) means pro-RTO




(1)! How would you describe your customer base? Age, gender, race, location. 
(2)! What are the alternatives people consider when deciding to come to your store?  Cash purchases at department store/Installment purchases/Purchase 
with credit card. 
(3)!
How does the rental initiation process work? 
How does the paperwork look like? 
What screening tools do you use?  
Do you use a scoring model? 
Personal References: Do you just check that these are real people or 
you also consider implicit financial guarantees? (His/her mother is 
going to pay for it) 
Do you reject applicants? How? 
Are you able to tell ex-ante who will default? 
(4)! How do customer make the periodic payments? Cash in store/Deposit in some bank account/On-line? 
(5)! Do you face a lot of late payments/customers skipping? How do you deal with these non-payments? In house/Outsource? Do late payment/skipping vary across product type, as well as the 
money/product collection process? 
(6)! Do most people rent temporarily or to term?  Does this vary across product type? What do you think motivates people to rent temporarily? Seasonal 
workers/people needing to try things out before actual purchase. 
(7)! What threshold do you use to perform a credit check? What kinds of customers go above this threshold? Do you change contract terms for these customers? 
Does the purpose of the rental change, with more temporary rentals 
than rentals to term? 
(8)! What are your thoughts on the complementarities between AFS? How did your offering of Tax Preparation Services and RALs work out? Do 





(9)! What can you say about returning customers?  !!!! Table A3.1: List of interview questions to industry participants - Demand side questions.
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Category Question 
(1) Where does most of your revenue come from? Which type of customer? Which product? 
(2)! How can your costs be explained? I would like to understand your cost structure. 
Good purchases/Payroll/Store expenses/Inventory costs. 
(3)! Who do you buy from? How do you choose what to buy? Do you offer a lot of brands for each product?  
Do you take advantage of good buying opportunities and stock up? Or 
you make regular purchases? 
(4)! How do you set cash/weekly/monthly prices? Dishwashers seem to be priced lower than laptops maybe due to a lower probability of default and loss of merchandise/lower resale value 
after stolen. 
Do you follow competitor’s prices? Which competitors? 
(5)! Who do you feel are your closest competitors?  Do you compete in price?  Do you compete in quality? Consumer satisfaction in store/better 
products or brands. 
(6)! How do you advertise? Print/Rely on word of mouth/TV/Radio. 
Supply 
Side 
(7)! What motivated you to sell 10 stores to Aaron’s? !
Category Question 
(1) If I have follow up questions, whom do I contact? 























Min 10 60 $2.1 $0.3 $7.4
P25 43.5 261 $9.1 $1.4 $34.1
P50 113 678 $23.8 $3.6 $96.2
P75 239.5 1437 $50.3 $7.7 $186.6
Max 973 5838 $204.3 $31.0 $716.0
Mean 162.84 977.04 $34.2 $5.2 $125.5
Table A3.3: Summary statistics of the economic impact of the RTO industry in the US. Data for the 50 U.S.
states. Data obtained from APRO (2013).





Texas 973 5838 $204.3 $31.0 $716.0
Florida 558 3348 $117.0 $18.0 $411.0
Ohio 388 2328 $81.5 $12.5 $285.5
Georgia 364 2184 $76.4 $11.7 $268.0
California 341 2046 $71.6 $11.0 $251.0
North Carolina 334 2004 $70.0 $10.7 $245.7
Tennessee 309 1854 $65.0 $9.9 $227.4
Missouri 184 1104 $58.2 $8.9 $204.0
New York 271 1626 $57.0 $8.7 $199.0
Louisiana 272 1632 $57.0 $8.7 $200.0
Indiana 263 1578 $55.0 $8.5 $194.0
Pennsylvania 257 1542 $53.9 $8.3 $189.1
Illinois 243 1458 $51.0 $7.8 $179.0
Virginia 229 1374 $48.1 $7.4 $168.5
Michigan 218 1308 $45.7 $7.0 $160.0
South Carolina 212 1272 $44.5 $6.8 $156.0
Arkansas 201 1206 $42.0 $6.5 $148.0
Alabama 203 1218 $42.6 $6.5 $149.0
Kentucky 185 1110 $39.0 $5.9 $136.0
Mississippi 277 1662 $38.6 $5.9 $135.0
Oklahoma 172 1032 $36.1 $5.5 $126.6
Kansas 142 852 $30.0 $4.6 $104.0
Arizona 143 858 $30.0 $4.6 $105.2
Washington 135 810 $28.3 $4.3 $99.3
Colorado 126 756 $26.5 $4.0 $93.0
Maryland 100 600 $21.0 $3.2 $73.6
Massachusetts 92 552 $19.0 $2.9 $67.7
Iowa 86 516 $18.1 $2.8 $63.3
New Mexico 77 462 $16.2 $2.5 $56.7
Oregon 71 426 $14.9 $2.3 $52.2
Connecticut 70 420 $14.7 $2.2 $52.0
New Jersey 64 384 $13.4 $2.1 $47.1
Nebraska 52 312 $10.9 $1.7 $38.3
West Virginia 54 324 $11.3 $1.7 $39.7
Maine 51 306 $10.7 $1.6 $37.5
Utah 51 306 $10.7 $1.6 $37.5
New Hampshire 45 270 $9.5 $1.4 $33.0
Wisconsin 43 258 $9.0 $1.4 $31.6
Nevada 39 234 $8.1 $1.3 $29.0
Idaho 34 204 $7.1 $1.1 $25.0
Wyoming 31 186 $6.5 $1.0 $22.8
Delaware 32 192 $6.7 $1.0 $24.0
South Dakota 25 150 $5.3 $0.8 $18.4
Rhode Island 24 144 $5.0 $0.8 $17.6
Hawaii 23 138 $4.8 $0.7 $17.0
Montana 20 120 $4.2 $0.6 $14.7
Vermont 19 114 $3.9 $0.6 $14.0
North Dakota 18 108 $3.8 $0.6 $13.0
Alaska 11 66 $2.3 $0.4 $8.1
Minnesota 10 60 $2.1 $0.3 $7.4
Table A3.4: Economic impact of the RTO industry by state. Data obtained from APRO (2013).
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Chapter 4
The Data: Item- and Agreement-level
Information
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I use proprietary micro-level data from a medium-sized RTO chain in Ohio to analyze the
behavior of consumers and the transaction-level performance of RTO firms. This section paves the way for
the estimation of a dynamic model of consumer behavior and firm profitability in chapter 5 and chapter 6,
since these data are going to be used in the estimation of such structural model.
The RTO industry has been relatively unexplored in academic settings. The review of the literature
presented in chapter 2 revealed that early papers studying consumer behavior in RTO contracts, including
Swagler and Wheeler (1989) and and Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999), relied on survey data and a small
number of observations. Survey data introduces serious limitations since reported behavior and intentions
very often differ from actual decisions. As a result of the increased availability of detailed microdata in
recent years, two papers tried to analyze consumer behavior using transaction-level information: Anderson
and Jackson (2004) and Anderson and Jaggia (2009). A quote from the later paper exposes the problem
with the work presented in them: “the information was gathered with the cooperation of the Association of
Progressive Rental Organizations (APRO), the industry trade group”. This gives rise to a clear conflict of
interest and questions the objectivity of the presented analysis.
This chapter contains the first fully independent study of RTO using micro-level data. To the best of my
knowledge, there is no other study based on transaction-level data that has not been commissioned by the
industry. The data was gathered without the cooperation of the industry association, which enables me to
48
perform purely objective research.
Section 4.2 describes the dataset and performs reduced-form analysis. First, the study of item-level data
will help the reader understand the performance of the firm at the micro-level. I think of the firm as investing
in various durable goods and selling contracts on them to consumers. I am interested in understanding what
the rate of return on this activity is and what are the factors that affect this rate of return. Second, the data
at the agreement-level reveal patterns of behavior of those consumers who choose to go into RTO contracts.
The data help resolve the existing controversy regarding contract use, in particular, regarding the proportion
of RTO customers that rent items to term. The empirical patterns of consumer behavior presented in section
4.2.2 will provide the identifying variation for the estimation of the model later in this dissertation. This
behavior also motivates some of the questions and counterfactuals presented in chapter 6.
4.2 The Data
The dataset consists of proprietary information from a medium-sized independent RTO chain in Ohio. It
contains information from its 15 stores until close of business Monday, April 4th, 2011. To ensure the
confidentiality of the data, the software firm has delivered de-identified information. Variables, such as
name, address, Social Security number, driver’s license number, and phone numbers of customers involved
in the RTO agreements, have been stripped out1.
The dataset includes inventory items purchased by the RTO chain as early as 1997 and as late as the
date the data were gathered in April 2011. I make use of a subset of all the items included in this dataset.
I include items purchased early enough to allow them to get charged off, that is, to allow them to be rented
to term, acquired through the early payout option, acquired through a cash sale or stolen, by the time the
data were gathered. Charged off inventory items are purged and removed from the data set three years after
their charge off date. To avoid problems related to the purging practice employed by the data management
firm2, I also include items purchased late enough. As a result, and after the filtering of spoiled records and
transactions with missing information, for the analysis I consider 10,103 items purchased by the firm in a
one year period around April 2008. Almost 95% of these items had been charged off by the time of the data
gathering in April 2011.
1This research project has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at Columbia University.
2To illustrate why the purging practice represents a problem, assume we have two items bought by the store in January
2007, but one is charged off in March of 2008, while the other one is charged off in May of the same year. Since the data
were gathered in April of 2011, and information on charged off items is kept for only three years after the charge off date, we
would observe information on the later item but not on the former. For some product categories, for instance, items charged off
earlier are less profitable than items charged off later in their lives. For those categories, neglecting the fact that information
on some items charged off early has been purged would result in an overestimation of firm performance at the item level. It is
to mitigate this problem that I only include items purchased by the firm at most six months before April 2008 in the sample.
In this way I significantly reduce the bias introduced by the purging practice.
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Detailed information on the firm’s inventory items is contained in the data, including a full description of
the product, cost and original purchase date, the cash flow it generated, and data on past agreement activity
in terms of the number of RTO contracts the item was involved in. The information at the item level will
be analyzed in this chapter to give the reader a flavor of the micro-level financial performance of RTO firms.
The dataset spans items in various product categories including appliances, furniture, TVs, computers and
electronics.
Inventory items are usually involved in more than one RTO agreement before they are charged off. In
addition to data on inventory items, the dataset also contains detailed information of the last RTO agreement
an item participated in. The data at the agreement level consist of a description of the terms of the agreement
and the decisions of the individual signing the agreement at every point in time. It provides insight into
the incentives and trade-offs RTO consumers face and will be employed to estimate the structural model in
chapter 5. To estimate this model, I need to observe the behavior of multiple consumers facing the same
contract terms. For this reason I will focus the analysis on the the most popular items within each product
category. I therefore work with a panel dataset of 5,226 RTO agreements across the five product categories:
appliances, furniture, TVs, computers and electronics, involving washers and dryers, mattresses and living
room sets, flat-screen TVs, video game consoles and laptop computers, respectively.
4.2.1 Item-level data: Firm performance
Detailed information on inventory items is contained in the data, including a full description of the product,
cost and original purchase date, the cash flow it generated, and data on past agreement activity in terms of
the number of RTO contracts the item was involved in.
The dataset spans various product categories listed in table 4.1. The largest number of items corresponds
to furniture, followed by appliances, TVs, electronics and computers. Within each category, the items most
frequently observed in the data are washers and dryers, mattresses and living room sets, flat-screen TVs,
video game consoles and laptop computers, respectively. The “Other” category is a very heterogeneous group
of items including toys, jewelry, loan equipment and even hot tubs.








Table 4.1: Item Categories.
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The mean value of the different variables available across product categories is presented in table 4.2
below. We observe the cost of the items the firm commercializes ranges between $200 and $700, the least
expensive items being electronics, and the most expensive TVs. Items participate in between two and three
rental purchase agreements before they end up in the hands of the consumer permanently. The variables
percentage_time_rent and months_until_first_rent give the reader a sense of the total shelf time and initial
shelf time, respectively. If we interpret these as a measure of the relative attractiveness of the item, we see
that computers and appliances seem to be the most attractive items since they rent of fast, and electronics
the least since they wait in shelf the longest. Regarding the terms of the RTO agreement, that is the monthly
rental rate and the contract length, items that depreciate faster and require more servicing carry shorter
terms and larger monthly rates. All else equal, higher-cost items carry larger rates than lower cost ones.
Further discussion on the terms of the RTO agreements can be found in sections 4.2.2 in this chapter. The
second to last column of table 4.2 shows that a significant amount of items display unfavorable charge-offs
to the firm, that is, participate in agreements where the customer stops making rental payments and refuses
to return the item to the store.
Category orig_cost times_rented percentage_time_rent
months_until_
first_rent monthly_rate monthly_term stolen_dummy
monthly_rate
_of_return
Appliances $356.79 2.05 81% 2.47 $56.04 22.95 6% 6%
Furniture $265.15 2.52 70% 3.52 $56.67 14.98 7% 7%
TVs $695.87 2.53 74% 2.89 $73.56 18.98 18% 2%
Computers $509.73 2.24 75% 1.68 $68.99 12.22 15% 3%
Electronics $205.37 3.11 54% 3.83 $43.11 10.98 16% 3%
Other $254.86 2.61 94% 2.16 $52.23 8.99 5% 11%
Total $377.99 3.14 72% 3.00 $59.09 16.18 8% 5%
Table 4.2: Mean value of variables in item-level data across product categories.
It is in the last column of table 4.2 that I am most interested in. This variable gives us an idea of the
performance of the RTO firm at the item level. If we think of the firm as investing in various durable goods
and selling contracts on them to consumers, we are interested in the following questions: What is the rate
of return on this activity? What item characteristics affect these rates of return the most?







# of months until charged off
− 1
This is the effective monthly rate the shop obtains from offering RTO contracts to consumers. “Revenue
from item” is the total dollar amount the shop obtains from renting out the item, it includes rental and early
purchase option payments. “Cost of item” is simply the amount the shop paid for the durable good, and “#
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of months until charged off” is the number of months the item generated cash flows until it got charged off.
Figure 4.1 presents the rate of return distribution for all items in the data. The mean (median) monthly
return is 4.99% (5.21%). Two very different pictures become visible when I separate items two groups: the
8.4% of items that were stolen and those that were not. Items that end up being stolen yield a much smaller
rate of return of 1.6% (-5.07%), as can be seen in figure 4.2. A significant amount of agreements end up with
customers neither making the contractual payments nor returning the item, which dents the profits of the







-1 -.5 0 .5
Rate of Return (Monthly)
All Items
mean std. dev p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
4.99% 17.54% 0.36% 3.35% 5.21% 7.35% 11.02%










-1 -.5 0 .5
Rate of Return (Monthly)
Stolen Items
mean std. dev p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
15.30% 17.54% 0.36% 3.35% 5.21% 7.35% 11.02%
mean std. dev p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
5.91% 17.20% 1.52% 3.72% 5.43% 7.56% 11.32%
mean std. dev p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
-5.07% 18.05% -26.89% -5.21% 1.60% 4.00% 5.85%
Figure 4.2: Monthly rate of return distribution








-1 -.5 0 .5
Rate of Return (Monthly)
Non-Stolen Items
mean std. dev p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
15.30% 17.54% 0.36% 3.35% 5.21% 7.35% 11.02%
mean std. dev p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
5.91% 17.20% 1.52% 3.72% 5.43% 7.56% 11.32%
mean std. dev p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
-5.07% 18.05% -26.89% -5.21% 1.60% 4.00% 5.85%Figure 4.3: Monthly rate of return distribution
across inventory items - Non-Delinquent Items.
When looking at rates of return by product category, we observe that these are negatively correlated
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Category Mean return Median return Percentage Skip
Appliances 5.5% 5.2% 5.7%
Furniture 6.7% 6.1% 6.5%
TVs 2.3% 4.2% 18.0%
Computers 3.5% 4.9% 15.0%
Electronics 2.9% 5.3% 16.0%
Other 10.8% 9.6% 4.7%
Table 4.3: Rate of return by category.
with the proportion of items that end up being stolen. As table 4.3 shows, furniture and appliances are the
highest yielding product categories, and also the categories with the lowest proportion of items ending up in
delinquency. TVs, computers and electronics yield lower rates of return, and have also the largest probability
of ending up stolen.
I run a simple OLS regression of the rate of return on a series of covariates that confirms the findings
presented so far. The predictor variables are the product categories, the cost of the item, the number of
times the item was rented out, the proportion of time the item was on rent with respect to the time until
charge off, the initial “shelf time” or number of months until first rental, the monthly rental rate, the monthly
term of a RTO agreement on the item, and a dummy indicating whether the item was stolen. I also control
for the store where the item is located.
The regression results presented in table 4.4 confirms that furniture and appliances are the most prof-
itable product categories, and that stolen items are significantly less profitable than non-stolen ones. It is
surprising that the cost variable is not statistically significant. Nor is the monthly rental rate variable. Vari-
ables including the initial shelf time, and the term of the agreement, are statistically but not economically
significant. The variable “percentage_time_rented” is statistically significant, indicating that shelf time in





















Table 4.4: Rate of return regression results. Store number fixed effects were included but are not reported
in the table.
Even after delinquency affects the performance of the RTO firm at the transaction level, the monthly
rate of return derived from the RTO activity is quite high, ranging from 2%-11% a month, or 25%-250% a
year. On the other hand, we saw in section 3.3.2 in chapter 3 that the profit margin and return on equity of
publicly traded RTO firms stand roughly in the median of all U.S. industries. 3 How can we reconcile these
two facts? This questions certainly deserves further work. My hypothesis is that the seemingly large margin
of profit shown on the transaction level is be driven away when store- and business-level fixed costs are
spread onto individual transactions. In the context of the payday industry, Wu (2008) reaches very similar
conclusions.
4.2.2 Agreement-level data: Consumer behavior
In this section I analyze information at the RTO agreement level. I focus on RTO contracts of new items
since I have reliable information on the pricing of only such agreements. These data will be used to estimate
the model presented in chapter 5, for which I need to observe the behavior of multiple consumers facing the
same contract terms. For this reason I will focus the analysis on the the most popular items within product
categories. I therefore work with a panel dataset of 5,226 RTO agreements across five product categories:
appliances, furniture, TVs, computers and electronics. For each agreement, I have detailed information on
the characteristics of the underlying item, as well as detailed contract pricing and term information. Also, for
each RTO contract, I observe the decisions of the individual at every point in time. Table 4.5 describes the
3The performance of the independent chain is also in line with that of the publicly traded RTO firms. For confidentiality
reasons, I cannot reveal the exact numbers.
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number of observations, gives an example of the item underlying the RTO contract, and presents contract
term information for the five product categories I work with.
Observations Example of Contract Term Monthly Rental Rate
(N) Item (T) (p)
Appliances 1,438 Washer/Dryer 21 $39
Furniture 1,161 Mattress 12 $84
TVs 815 42'' Plasma TV 21 $94
Computers 1,225 15'' Laptop Computer 12 $70
Electronics 587 PlayStation 3 12 $62
Table 4.5: Dataset description by category.
The main contract terms in a RTO agreement are the contract length and the monthly rental rate.
According to the president of the independent chain, there are two main item characteristics that influence
the terms of the RTO agreement: the depreciation suffered and the amount of servicing typically required
by the item. Items that depreciate faster and require more servicing carry shorter terms and larger monthly
rates. Everything else equal, higher-cost items also carry larger rates than lower cost ones. In table 4.5 we see
that, on the one end, computers and quickly depreciating furniture items are available with relatively short
term agreements and high monthly rates. These items depreciate very fast. Computers become promptly
obsolete due to high levels of innovation in the industry. RTO customers are inexperienced computer users
that require significant customer service. Mattresses and sofas are very personal items. The store has no
option but to increase the monthly rate and decrease the agreement term to front load the cash flows it
can obtain from the item. On the opposite side of the spectrum lie appliances. Consumers can access these
with relatively long contracts and low monthly rates. These items depreciate much slower and require less
servicing. The store has no need to front load the cash it expects to receive from the agreement.
To better understand how consumers make use of RTO agreements, table 4.6 presents some statistics on
contract outcomes. The second column allows us to address the controversy regarding the proportion of RTO
customers that rent items to term, that is, that make all periodic rental payments until completion of the
contract to acquire the good. Data from the industry association indicate that only 8% of all transactions
nationwide are carried to completion4, while a recent study based on data of the FTC survey found that
close to 70% of consumers reported their installments resulted in a purchase5. Analysis of micro-level data
indicates that the actual number of consumers that rent to term might stand somewhere in the middle.
I observe that the proportion of agreements that end up in a rental to term stand between 5% and 14%
depending on the product category. As reflected in table 4.6, a large fraction of consumers, between 43%
4APRO (2013).
5McKernan et al (2003).
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and 48% of them, exercise the early return option. The early purchase option is also greatly exercised, in
between 20% and 39% of the contracts.
Early Return Rent to Term Early Purchase Option Stolen All
Appliances 43% 14% 39% 3% 100%
Furniture 49% 12% 34% 4% 100%
TVs 54% 5% 31% 10% 100%
Computers 55% 9% 27% 9% 100%
Electronics 58% 13% 20% 9% 100%
Table 4.6: Agreement Outcomes.
Table 4.6 provides clear evidence that consumers are making full use of the non-standard features of RTO
contracts, those features that differentiate RTO contracts from credit sales, pure retail and lease transactions.
For this reason, and picking up on the discussion presented in section 3.2.3 in chapter 3, it is very hard to
compare the cost to consumers of RTO with that of alternative contractual arrangements. More often than
not, consumers drop off the RTO contract before reaching the full maturity of the contract, via the early
return and early purchase options. Employing total of payments to compare RTO to pure retail, or the
implicit APR of renting to term to compare RTO to a credit sale, would imply overestimating the cost of
RTO. The reason is simple: not many consumers that initiate an agreement rent to term.
The timing of the different consumer decisions is of particular interest in the context of RTO. I analyze
consumer behavior over time in detail in the next subsection.
Empirical patterns of consumer behavior
Consumers that are part of a RTO contract each period can decide to make a rental payment (PAY), exercise
the early payout option and obtain ownership of the good (EPO), return the item to the store without further
obligation (RET), or steal the good (STL). I observe each of these consumer decisions in the panel dataset
of RTO agreements I work with in this sections. Figure A4.1 in the appendix depicts the proportion of
customers that choose each of these four options, at each point in time, for consumers remaining in the
contract, and for all product categories. Figure A4.1e, for instance, focuses on consumer decisions under
contracts that involve electronics. The blue dots represent the proportion of customers that decide to make
a rental payment each month, starting on month one, until the end of the contract. Green, red and turquoise
dots present the proportion of consumers who exercise the early payout option, the early return option and
steal the item, respectively.
As is evident from the graphs, the incentives and trade-offs consumer face when renting to own appliances,
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furniture, TVs, computers and electronics, change over time. Two areas can be distinguished in each graph.
In the first area, which lasts roughly half the contract length, the consumer has not built too much equity
in the contract and exercising the early payout option remains prohibitively expensive6. I observe most
consumers decide to make a rental payment, while some of them decide to return, presumably those who
are not satisfied with the item or suffered from a low income draw. In the second area, roughly equal to the
second half of the contract, the EPO price has decreased to a level consumers can afford. I therefore observe
a sharp increase in the proportion of individuals who exercise the EPO, with a consequent decrease in that
of payment and returns.
A slightly different pattern is present in figure A4.1a for the case of appliances. The first and second
areas described above are still present. Appliances display a third area toward the end of the contract, where
it seems like the attractiveness of the EPO as an option to consumers decreases since ownership through
renting to term is just around the corner. The percentage of consumers making a rental payment, therefore,
gains ground vis-a-vis the percentage choosing to exercise the EPO. The proportion of consumers returning
the item goes down over time as a result of the consumer building equity into the item. It is possible this
third area is present in the case of appliances since the RTO contract length for this category is relatively
long and monthly rates are relatively low, making renting to term attractive towards the end of the contract.
This behavior does not arise in TV agreements, which are also long, but involve large monthly rental rates. It
is hard to rationalize, though, why for this product category the relative attractiveness of the EPO decreases
as the contract approaches an end. With the EPO price going down over time, the relative attractiveness of
the EPO should only increase. The industry participants I interviewed could not provide an explanation for
the behavior observed in the case of appliances.
The consumer behavior depicted in figure A4.1 will provide the identifying variation for the estimation
of the model presented in chapter 5. This behavior also motivates some of the questions and counterfactuals
presented in chapter 6.
One question is related to the early return option. An aspect of the rent-to-own contract that stands
out is its high degree of flexibility. The information presented in table 4.6 and figure A4.1 seems to indicate
that some customers are taking advantage of the flexibility in the option to return items early. At the same
time, other consumers do not seem to be making use of this lack of long-term commitment at all. These
two groups of consumers can be clearly distinguished based on the data presented in table 4.4a. The table
shows the proportion of agreements that end up with the item returned during the first third of the contract,
6Remember that, as was described in section 3.4.3, the early purchase option price is dictated by state regulation: “At
any time after the initial payment, a lessee may acquire ownership of the property by paying an amount equal to the sum
by which the cash price of the leased property exceeds fifty percent of all lease payments made by the lessee”. This means






Appliances 36% 45% 45%
Furniture 45% 52% 46%
TVs 37% 44% 51%
Computers 50% 54% 42%
Electronics 39% 43% 57%
(a) Early return option
EPO first half EPO second half EPO last third
Appliances 3% 24% 24%
Furniture 7% 25% 22%
TVs 11% 24% 22%
Computers 5% 16% 15%
Electronics 12% 28% 21%
(b) Early purchase option
Figure 4.4: Timing of the exercise of the early return and early purchase options.
during the first half of the contract, and the proportion of agreements that do not conclude with a return.
Around 50% of the contracts end up with a return during the first half of the agreement and close to 50%
of the contracts do not culminate with a return (the EPO is exercised, the agreement is carried to term
or the items is stolen). Those consumers who return items do so very early: between 36% and 50% of
contracts, depending on the product category, end with early returns during the first third of the contract.
These early returns drive up the RTO firm’s costs. Returned items have suffered depreciation, and need to
undergo a reconditioning process in order to be re-rented. High RTO costs are likely to be passed on to RTO
consumers. Those consumers that do not exercise the early return option could be subsidizing the cost of
the RTO contract to those who do. I therefore want to understand what the welfare implications of reducing
the return flexibility in RTO contracts are.
A second question has to do with the early purchase option. In Ohio, the state where the dataset used
in this study is from, regulation imposes restrictions on the early purchase option schedule. The formula
chosen to dictate the shape of this schedule does not seem to follow an economic rationale. In chapter 6
I therefore study the welfare cost of RTO regulation in terms of restrictions on the early purchase option
schedule. The current schedule does not seem to be promoting the exercise of the early purchase option early
in the life of the contract. Only between 3% and 12% of contracts end through the early purchase option
during first half of the agreement, as can be seen in table 4.4b. Most consumers who exercise the option do
so during the last third of the contract, as is evident from the numbers presented in the last two columns
of table 4.4b. Alternative early purchase options price schedules might induce different patterns of behavior
that could make both consumers and RTO firms better off. These counterfactual exercises will be explored
in chapter 6.
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A discussion on delinquency
Table 4.7 shows the proportion of agreements in the data that end up with an item being stolen over time,
by product category. Two main observations arise. First, stealing occurs relatively infrequently, with the
per period empirical probability of STL being very small. Second, STL remains relatively stable over time,
lacking any dynamic behavior. This goes against the intuition that people who are planning to steal an item
would do so as early as possible in the life of the contract.
Mean t=1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 t=21
Appliance 0.3% 0.7% 0.2% 0.5% 0.8% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Furniture 0.6% 0.9% 0.6% 1.0% 1.3% 0.7% 0.2% 1.0% 0.9% 0.2% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0%
TVs 1.0% 2.1% 1.3% 1.0% 0.8% 1.3% 1.9% 1.6% 1.1% 1.2% 1.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.8% 1.6% 0.4% 0.4% 1.0% 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 2.2%
Computers 1.3% 2.1% 1.0% 1.8% 1.3% 1.0% 0.7% 1.3% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 4.7%
Electronics 1.3% 3.1% 1.9% 2.6% 2.2% 1.3% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 1.3% 1.5% 0.0%
Table 4.7: Empirical delinquency (STL) proportions over time by category.
This does not mean, however, that stealing does not affect the firm’s performance. While stealing
represents a drop in the bucket each period, its effect piles up over time and can significantly erode the
profitability of RTO agreements.
Table 4.8 shows the cumulative effect of stealing for different categories. The proportion of agreements
that end up with the item being stolen reaches non-negligible levels. I also present the same number at the
inventory item level, taking into account that items are typically involved in more than one RTO agreement.
The percentage of items that end up in delinquency is considerably high, reaching almost 20% for TVs, 19%
for electronics and 16% for computers. Delinquency is a serious problem in this industry.
Appliances Furniture TVs Computers Electronics
Agreements ending with STL 3.50% 4.40% 10.30% 8.80% 8.90%
Agreements per Item 1.73 1.83 1.93 1.85 2.12
Items ending with STL 6.00% 8.10% 19.90% 16.30% 18.80%
Table 4.8: Cumulative effect of delinquency (STL) at the agreement and item levels.
These observations related to delinquency motivate another set of counterfactuals presented in chapter
6. These exercises will attempt to answer the question of whether firms should invest in better delinquency
control and implement more stringent rental initiation conditions. And also whether these investments




In this chapter I presented a description of the proprietary dataset that motivates the development and
estimation of a dynamic structural model of consumer behavior and firm performance in the next two
chapters of this dissertation. The model will help us understand the incentives and trade-offs consumers
face, and how they impact firm profitability.
The reduced-form analysis carried out helps understand consumer behavior and contract use in RTO. I
addressed the controversy regarding the proportion of RTO customers that rent items to term. Consumer
advocates report the great majority of them do; the industry association states 75% return the rented item
within the first four months of the contract. The analysis of micro-level data shows that the truth lies
somewhere in the middle. The data also reveal that consumers respond to the incentives and trade-offs
presented to them by the contract. During the first half of the RTO agreement, the consumer has not built
too much equity in the contract and exercising the early payout option remains prohibitively expensive. I
observe most consumers decide to make a rental payment, while some of them decide to return the item,
presumably those who are not satisfied with the item or suffered a low income shock. During the second
half, the EPO price has decreased to a level consumers can afford. I therefore observe a sharp increase in the
proportion of individuals who exercise the EPO, with a consequent decrease in that of payment and returns.
Many consumers just stop making payments and do not return the item. Delinquency is a serious problem in
the industry that significantly affects the performance of RTO firms. Furniture items and appliances, items
that suffer the least from delinquency, are the most profitable product categories.
The central research questions I address via counterfactual exercises in chapter 6 are also motivated by
the reduced-form analysis presented in this chapter. The fact that around 50% of the contracts end up with
a return during the first half of the agreement, while close to 50% of the contracts do not culminate with a
return motivates the questions of what would happen to welfare if the return flexibility embedded in RTO
contracts was to be reduced. I also showed that the current early purchase option price schedule, dictated
by Ohio state regulation, only incentivizes consumers to exercise the option towards the very end of the
contract. This leads to an analysis of the welfare cost of RTO regulation in terms of restrictions on the early
purchase option schedule.
The reader is encouraged to turn to the next two chapter of this dissertation. These present a more























(a) Appliances real data



















(b) Furniture real data



















(c) TVs real data



















(d) Computers real data



















(e) Electronics real data
Figure A4.1: Empirical patterns in real data for all product categories. Proportion of consumers that
decide to make a rental payment (PAY), exercise the early payout option (EPO), return the item to the
store (RET), and steal the good (STL).
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Discrete Choice Model of
Consumer Behavior and Firm
Profitability in the Context of
Rent-to-Own
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I attempt to reveal patterns of consumer behavior and firm profitability in the context of the
rent-to-own (RTO) industry. To understand the incentives and trade-offs consumers face when making RTO
decisions, and how these impact firm profitability, I employ a dynamic structural model of consumer choice.
This model will be leveraged in the next chapter to show that there are a number of contract changes RTO
firms can introduce to increase consumer satisfaction and firm revenue simultaneously.
Understanding the behavior of consumers and the effect of contract changes is relevant since the RTO
agreement is the cornerstone of a large industry. It serves more than six million Americans each year,
operates 9,800 storefronts in all 50 U.S. states and Canada, generates over US$ 8.5 billion in revenues a
year, and employs more than 50,000 individuals1. Due to its unique nature, the RTO agreement is a very
interesting contract to study. It is a lease-purchase agreement different from a plain rental contract and a
credit sale. What distinguishes the RTO agreement from a plain rental contract is that the customer has the
1APRO (2013).
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option to purchase the item, either through renting to term or exercising an early buyout option. Customers
can also terminate the contract at any time, for any reason, without further obligation, therefore not being
subject to a fixed-term rental contract. What distinguishes the RTO agreement from a credit sale is, in
fact, the absence of traditional credit. No credit check is performed at the initiation of the contract and the
agreement can be terminated by the customer without credit consequences.
This chapter contains the first piece of work on the RTO industry to employ structural estimation tech-
niques. An attractive feature of this approach is that structural parameters have a transparent interpretation
within the theoretical model that frames the empirical investigation. Structural models therefore allow us to
credibly analyze the consequences of contract changes, regulatory changes and other counterfactual exercises
on social welfare. This analysis cannot be done on the basis of reduced-form work alone.
I begin by presenting a brief review of the main aspects of the RTO contract and the proprietary dataset
used in this study in section 5.2. I outline the theoretical model in section 5.3. Along the way, I describe the
challenges I faced during the estimation process and how I addressed these issues. A detailed description
of the parameter estimation procedure, which is done via simulated Maximum Likelihood, is described in
section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Overview of the rent-to-own contract and the data
As described in detail in section 3.2 in chapter 3, the RTO agreement provides consumers immediate access
to durable goods including appliances, furniture, TVs, computers and electronics, without a credit check or
down payment. In a typical RTO transaction, an agreement is written for a period of 6 to 36 months, with
the most common maturities lying between 12 and 24 months. The merchandise is delivered immediately
and rental payments are due monthly2. At the beginning of each month, a consumer can continue to rent by
paying for an additional period, or can return the good to the store without further obligation. The product
can be returned at any time for any reason. Consumers obtain ownership of the good by renting to term or
through early payment of a pre-specified cash price. The latter is called the early payout option. The rental
fee includes delivery, setup and service.
The dataset
The dataset consists of proprietary information from a medium-sized independent RTO chain in Ohio.
The data were gathered without the cooperation of the industry association, which enables me to perform
2I focus on monthly payment frequency contracts in this study. Many RTO stores also offer customers the possibility to pay
on a weekly or bi-weekly basis.
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purely independent research with transaction-level data. Also, to ensure the confidentiality of the data,
the software firm has delivered de-identified information. Variables, such as name, address, Social Security
number, driver’s license number, and phone numbers of customers involved in the RTO agreements, have
been stripped out3.
To estimate the dynamic model in this chapter, I work with a panel dataset of 5,226 RTO agreements
involving items purchased by the firm in a one year period around April 2008. These agreements involve the
most popular items across five product categories: appliances, furniture, TVs, computers and electronics. I
work with the most popular items since for the estimation of the model I need to observe the behavior of
multiple consumers facing the same contract terms. For each RTO contract I observe the decisions of the
individual at every point in time, as well as detailed information on the characteristics of the underlying
item and contract pricing and term information.
Table 5.1 describes the number of observations, gives an example of the item underlying the RTO contract,
and presents contract term information for the five product categories I work with.
Observations Example of Contract Term Monthly Rental Rate
(N) Item (T) (p)
Appliances 1,438 Washer/Dryer 21 $39
Furniture 1,161 Mattress 12 $84
TVs 815 42'' Plasma TV 21 $94
Computers 1,225 15'' Laptop Computer 12 $70
Electronics 587 PlayStation 3 12 $62
Table 5.1: Dataset description by category.
A brief description of the contract terms in table 5.1 is due. According to the president of the inde-
pendent chain, there are two main item characteristics that influence the terms of the RTO agreement: the
depreciation suffered and the amount of servicing typically required by the item. Items that depreciate faster
and require more servicing carry shorter terms. Everything else equal, higher cost items also carry larger
rates than lower cost ones. These observations are consistent with the contract terms presented in table 5.1.
The reader is referred to chapter 4 for a detailed description of the dataset, the environment and more
detailed reduced-form analysis. Of particular interest is the analysis presented in section 4.2.2, studying the
data at the agreement level and explaining the patterns of observed consumer behavior.
3This research project has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at Columbia University.
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5.3 Description of the model
The trade-offs I want to capture using the model are the following. Consumers that are part of a rent-to-own
contract each period can decide to make a rental payment, exercise the early payout option and obtain
ownership of the good, return the item to the store without further obligation, or steal the good. If the
consumer decides to make a rental payment, she will derive utility from usage of the good, which can be
understood as the sum of the value of accessing the good, plus an additional value of the servicing included
in the contract. She also has the possibility to acquire the item in the future by either renting to term or
exercising the early payout option, which carries an option value. She faces, however, the risk of losing access
to the item altogether if she cannot afford rental payments in the future. If she decides to obtain ownership
by exercising the early payout option, she will derive utility from owning the good. This comes both from the
value of accessing the good and an additional satisfaction of becoming the owner of an item. She assumes,
however, all responsibility in case of malfunctioning. If the item is returned, the consumer neither derives
utility from usage, nor from ownership. Finally, when an item is stolen the individual suffers a disutility
from bad reputation, but gets the benefit of owning the good immediately. Before entering a RTO contract,
the consumer can decide whether to initiate such a contract or choose an outside option, such as going to
Walmart to purchase the item.
I work with a single-agent, finite horizon, dynamic discrete choice model. The horizon will be equal to
the rent-to-own contract length4. The agent faces uncertainty regarding income and maximizes expected
discounted utility.
Consumers who are part of a rent-to-own contract each period have to decide whether to make a rental
payment and continue in the contract (PAY ), or to drop out of the contract either by exercising the early
payout option (EPO) or returning the item (RET ). They also have the option to run away with the
item without paying (STL). Therefore the consumer’s decision set is dt = {PAY,EPO,RET, STL} if the
individual is in the contract (d0 = RTO). RET , EPO and STL are terminating actions that bring the
model to an absorbing state. A consumer staying in the contract until the end obtains ownership of the
good. Figure 5.1 illustrates the choices faced by consumers over time.
4I found motivation in models of retirement from the labor force such as Rust and Phelan (1997) & Karlstrom, and Palme
& Svensson (2004). In these models, the individual makes the choice of whether to retire each year for a finite number of years,
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Figure 5.1: Choices the consumer faces over time.
Instantaneous utility is given by
u (yt, p, pEPOt, dt) =

ϕ+ log (yt − p) dt = PAY
δt−1Γ+ log (yt − pEPOt) dt = EPO
log (yt) dt = RET
k + log (yt) dt = STL
where p is the monthly rental rate, pEPOt is the early purchase option price specified in the RTO contract5,
yt is the individual income and dt is the consumer’s decision. The utility parameter ϕ represents the per
period utility from usage, while Γ indicates the total utility of ownership6. The depreciation rate of the
ownership value is represented by δ and the net utility of stealing an item is characterized by κ.
Section 4.2.2 in chapter 3 provides background on the modeling choice of the consumer’s stealing option.
There I show that stealing occurs relatively infrequently in the data, with the per period empirical probability
of STL being very small. In addition, STL remains relatively stable over time, lacking any dynamic behavior.
This goes against the intuition that people who are planning to steal an item would do so as early as possible
in the life of the contract. Given the stable and non-dynamic nature of stealing behavior, this option is
modeled with a constant net (dis)utility from stealing.
The main state variables of the model are {t, yt}, time and income. Income will be assumed to evolve
stochastically according to a persistent process which will be described in section 5.3.1. Unobserved state
variables εdt, assumed to be additively separable with respect to instantaneous utility and to follow an iid
5The early purchase option price is dictated by state regulation: “At any time after the initial payment, a lessee may acquire
ownership of the property by paying an amount equal to the sum by which the cash price of the leased property exceeds fifty
percent of all lease payments made by the lessee”. This means pEPOt = CashPrice − t∗p2 where t represents the number of
payments the consumer has made so far. In other words, the early purchase option price decreases linearly over time. And the
cash price is typically set up so that the EPO price and the monthly rental rate are similar to each other on the last month
of the RTO contract. A graph of the EPO price function can be found in section 6.4.2 of this chapter, where counterfactual
exercises are run.
6The parameter Γ could be interpreted as the limit of an infinite discounted sum of per period utility of ownership η:
Γ = (δβ)0 η + (δβ)1 η + (δβ)2 η + . . . = η1−δβ . This interpretation breaks down, however, if δβ ￿ 1.
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type I extreme value distribution, complete the set of state variables. The Bellman equation will be given
by the following formula
V (yt, t) = Max
dt

u (yt, p, pEPOt, dt) + βEV [yt+1, t+ 1] + ε1t dt = PAY
u (yt, p, pEPOt, dt) + βEDV (yt) + ε2t dt = EPO
u (yt, p, pEPOt, dt) + βEDV (yt) + ε3t dt = RET
u (yt, p, pEPOt, dt) + βEDV (yt) + ε4t dt = STL

where EDV (yt) =
￿∞
τ=1 β
τ−1E [log (yτ+t) | yt], that is, the expected discounted value of future income.
A consumer that rents to term, that is someone who makes all monthly rental payments until the end of
the contract to obtain ownership of the item, in the last period (t = T ) gets utility





I am ultimately interested in estimating θ1 = {ϕ,Γ, δ,κ}. In these models, the discount factor β is
typically not estimated. Magnac and Thesmar (2002) shows that in general dynamic discrete choice models
are nonparametrically underidentified, without knowledge of the discount factor and the distribution of the
ε shocks. I will assume β = .99, but estimation results are robust to changes in the assumed discount factor.
I close the model by allowing the consumer to make an initial static decision of whether to enter a RTO
contract or choose an outside option (OUT ). This can be understood as the customer having the option to
go to Walmart. In reality, the consumer has many options to choose from at t = 0 7, including going to a
retailer to purchase the item in cash, using a credit card to buy the item, initiating a pure lease transaction,
or using the cash to go on vacations, among others. I decided to model the outside option in the simplest
possible way. This is because I found little data on the consumers’ availability and choice regarding the
outside option; it would be very difficult to estimate a model with a more complex initial choice structure.
Since I mostly care about the dynamic behavior of consumers once inside a RTO agreement, giving up
complexity in the way I model the outside option choice does not come at a great cost. This initial choice
dt = {RTO,OUT} is represented in figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Choices the consumer faces over time including outside option.
Mathematically, consumer’s utility form choosing to go into a RTO contract and from choosing the
outside option at t = 0 would be given by
u (y0, d0) =

EVt=0 (θ1, y0) + εRTO d0 = RTO
χ0 + εOUT d0 = OUT
(5.1)
where EVt=0 (θ, y0) is the expected value to the consumer of getting into the RTO contract, and χ0 is
the utility value of the outside option. Unobserved state variables εd0 are also assumed to be additively
separable with respect to instantaneous utility and to follow an iid type I extreme value distribution. χ0 is
an additional parameter to be recovered, the parameter set becomes θ = {ϕ,Γ, δ,κ,χ0}.
5.3.1 Stochastic evolution of income
Calibrating the income process using exogenous measures of labor income risk
As described earlier, to estimate the model, I make use of a proprietary panel dataset containing consumer
decisions. Unfortunately, the dataset does not contain information on the evolution of consumer income.
I therefore calibrate the model using estimates from the existing literature estimating labor income risk
processes in the U.S.8
Some examples of papers in this literature are Hubbard et al. (1994), Carroll and Samwick (1997) and
Guvenen (2009). The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has become the preferred choice of data
source in these studies thanks to it being the income panel dataset with the longest time dimension that is
publicly available.
The most suitable estimates for my application are found in Guvenen (2009), where evidence on labor
8Note that what matters in my model is the evolution of disposable income. The literature estimating income risk processes
focuses on labor income, not including expenditures. While I am aware this will not perfectly reflect the evolution of disposable
income, it is the best I can do at this point given the scarcity of studies focusing on the evolution of disposable income.
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income risk is presented for different educational groups. I will work with estimates corresponding to the
educational group that most closely represents RTO customers, that is, high school graduates9.
Regarding the specific modeling assumptions, uncertain income evolves stochastically according to a
persistent AR(1) process
log (yt+1) = ρlog (yt) + εt








will be obtained from Guvenen (2009). These
estimates of the persistence and variance of the income process are based on low-frequency annual data from
the PSID. For my particular application, where RTO customers make decisions on a monthly basis, I need to
convert them into monthly frequency. I perform this yearly to monthly conversion using theoretical results
from Amemiya and Wu (1972). To make this transformation I need the annual process to be stationary,
which is satisfied in this application. Further details on the estimation of income processes in the literature
and their frequency conversion are presented in section 5.6.1 in the appendix.
After selecting the most relevant estimates from the literature and applying the annual to monthly
conversion, the persistence of the monthly process is set at a value of ρ = 0.99, while the variance of the
shock is set at σ2ε = 0.0474.
Discretization of income process
When solving the model numerically, I need to replace the continuous-valued autoregressive income process
by a discrete state-space Markov chain. A variety of methods for approximating stationary AR(1) processes
are used in the literature. These methods basically differ in they way they choose the two ingredients we
need to approximate a continuous process: the points on the state space and the transition probabilities.
Researchers typically employ the method presented in Tauchen (1986). However, Kopecky and Suen (2010)
show that the performance of this approximation method suffers for processes with high serial correlation.
They propose the use of the Rouwenhorst method (Rouwenhorst (1995)) and show it is more reliable than
other approaches in approximating highly persistent processes since it can match five important statistics of
any stationary AR(1) process: the conditional and unconditional mean, the conditional and unconditional
variance, and the first-order autocorrelation. The Rouwenhorst method is therefore the method of choice in
this study.
9The reader is referred to section 3.3.1 in chapter 3 for a description of the socio-economic characteristics of RTO consumers.
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The distribution of initial income
Before proceeding to estimate the model, I make additional assumptions about the initial income distribution.
To allow for heterogeneity across individuals, I assume initial income y0 has a lognormal distribution. This
same assumption is found in Einav, Jenkins and Levine (2012), which estimates a consumer optimization
model in the context of the subprime auto loan market.
The moments of the distribution are calibrated using micro-level data. The relevant measure of income
in the model described in this section is disposable income; we need information on income as well as
expenditures. Using data at the household level from the U.S. census 2010 for the relevant geographical
area in Ohio, we can obtain information on income for the bottom income quartile of the population10. The
Census data do not contain comprehensive expenditure data. For this reason, we complement the analysis
using household expenditure data from the Basic Family Budget Calculator (Economic Policy Institute),
also for or the relevant geographical area in Ohio in 2010. Sources of expenditures included in these data are
housing, gas, electricity, water, transport and food. Only mean levels of household expenditures, however,
are reported by the Economic Policy Institute.
Using data from these two sources, I find that the approximate expected value of disposable income for
the relevant population is $33011, with a standard deviation equal to $22012. I have tested the robustness of
the estimation results to changes in the parametrization of the initial income distribution. Results remain
quantitatively similar.
5.4 Estimation procedure
Estimates of the model parameters will be obtained via simulated Maximum Likelihood. Due to the existence
of unobservable and persistent state variables (the income chains of consumers), deriving the log-likelihood
function that I need to maximize is not a trivial task.
5.4.1 Deriving and computing the likelihood
The full log-likelihood function is given by L (θ) =
￿N
n=1 Ln (θ) =
￿N
n=1 ln [ln (θ)], where ln (θ) is the
contribution to the likelihood of each individual in the dataset. Conditional on deciding to enter a RTO
contract at t = 0, that is conditional on d0 = RTO, ln (θ) is given by
10As discussed in section 3.3.1 in chapter 3, the bottom income quartile is the most representative income bracket of RTO
customers.
11This mean comes from subtracting expenditure mean levels from income mean levels.
12This number is just the standard deviation measure obtained from income data.
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f (yt | yt−1) f (y1 | y0) dy1 . . . dyT￿ ￿￿ ￿
(￿)
 f (y0 | d0 = RTO) dy0
where dt represents the decision of the individual, zt are strictly exogenous variables such as the rental
rate and the early payout option price, and yt is the income of the consumer.
This likelihood specification handles the initial conditions problem in dynamic, nonlinear, unobserved
effects models as described in Wooldridge (2005). Rather than attempting to obtain the joint distribution
of all outcomes of the endogenous variables, Wooldridge suggests finding the distribution conditional on the
initial value (and the observed history of strictly exogenous explanatory variables).
The second line in equation 5.2 shows that to obtain the likelihood of observed consumer decisions, I
need to integrate out the persistent unobservables (y0, y1, . . . , yT ). The third line arises from the Markovian
feature of the problem, and from the fact that the unobservables follow an AR (1) process. Finally, the
fourth line shows that I can evaluate the likelihood for a single individual by first computing (￿), that is, by
first integrating out (y1 . . . yt) conditional on y0; and then computing the integral corresponding to y0.
To compute (￿) in equation 5.2, I need to apply numerical integration techniques. The simplest way to
compute the integral is to simulate NSIM number of income chains conditional on y0, and to then compute
the mean of
￿T
t=1 P (dt | dt−1, zt, yt) across simulated income chains. For estimation, I use NSIM=1000.
Section 6.3 presents evidence that there is no need to work with a larger number of simulated income chains
per consumer.
To perform the integral corresponding to y0, in turn, I need to find f (y0 | d0 = RTO), which by Bayes’
rule and discretizing is equal to
P (Y0 = y0 | D0 = RTO) = P (D0 = RTO | Y0 = y0,χ0)P (Y0 = y0)
P (D0 = RTO)
In addition, I will assume that the model probability of choosing to go into RTO at t = 0 should be equal
to the observed market share of RTO, that is, the following should be satisfied
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P (D0 = RTO) =
￿
y0
P (D0 = RTO | Y0 = y0,χ0)P (Y0 = y0) = s0
where s0 corresponds to the empirical share of individuals that decide to go into a RTO contract.
Computing empirical rent-to-own market shares
The approximate value of the market share of RTO (s0) will be based on store count. To compute such a
number, I collect data on the number of stores RTO firms and competitors have in the relevant Ohio counties
and arrive at market share numbers that are allowed to vary across categories. Table 5.2 shows the store
count data and the market share numbers used for estimation13.
# of Stores Appliances Furniture TVs Computers Electronics
Walmart 144 Y Y Y Y Y
Target 63 Y Y Y Y Y
Sears 19 Y Y Y Y Y
Kmart 63 Y Y Y Y Y
Best Buy 39 Y Y Y Y Y
Radio Shadk 212 Y N Y Y Y
Costco 7 Y Y Y Y Y
Game Club 130 N N N Y Y
Sam's Club 28 Y Y Y Y Y
PcMall 1 N N N Y Y
f.y.e. 20 N N N N Y
Total # of Competitors 726 575 363 575 706 726
RTO Stores 428 428 428 428 428 428
Market Share RTO - 43% 54% 43% 38% 37%
Table 5.2: Market share of RTO computation.
5.4.2 Conditional choice probabilities
The conditional choice probabilities P (dt | dt−1, zt, yt) in equation 5.2 above are standard dynamic logit
probabilities. Given a value of θ = {ϕ,Γ, δ,κ,χ0}, I can solve the model by backward induction and compute
these probabilities for every income state and every time period.
P (dt = PAY | yt, zt, θ) , P (dt = EPO | yt, zt, θ) , P (dt = RET | yt, zt, θ) , P (dt = STL | yt, zt, θ)
for t = 1 . . . T and
13I am aware this is an approximate number and that there are many alternative ways to estimate such a measure. One
option would be to substitute number of stores by square footage of stores. It could be argued that one Walmart store should
account for more traffic than one RTO store. But it is also true that Walmart offers many more items and product categories
than RTO stores do, thus making the need for such adjustment unclear. The outside option choice is modeled very simply in
this paper and I am really interested in the direction of the change in market share while performing counterfactual exercises,
rather than in the resulting new level of market share. This is why I decided not to add complexity to the method of computing
empirical market shares.
72
P (d0 = RTO | y0, z0, θ) , P (d0 = OUT | y0, z0, θ)
for t = 0.
For instance, the probability of making a rental payment at time t is
Prob (dt = PAY | yt, zt, θ) = exp (u (yt, p, pEPOt, dt = PAY ) + βEV [dt = PAY, yt+1, t+ 1])￿￿d=PAY,EPO,RET exp￿u￿yt, p, pEPOt, ￿dt￿+ βEV [dt = PAY, yt+1, t+ 1]￿
and the probability of choosing to go into a RTO contract at t = 0 is





To analyze the incentives and trade-offs consumers face in the context of rent-to-own, in this chapter I
develop and describe the estimation procedure of a structural model of consumer behavior using proprietary
transaction-level data. Several challenges had to be overcome along the way.
The central problem came from the fact that the data I use for the estimation does not contain information
on the evolution of consumer income. I solved this problem by calibrating the income process using exogenous
measures of labor income risk, obtained from the macroeconomic literature estimating labor income risk
processes in the U.S. For my particular application, where RTO customers make decisions on a monthly basis,
I also needed to convert these estimates into monthly frequency. To be able to solve the model numerically,
I replaced the continuous-valued income process by a discrete state-space Markov chain. Finally, I had to
adopt assumptions regarding the distribution of initial income and calibrate the moments of this distribution
using micro-level data.
Due to the existence of unobservable and persistent state variables, deriving the log-likelihood function
that I needed to maximize was not a trivial task. I also had to deal with initial conditions problem present
in dynamic, nonlinear, unobserved effects models.
Finally, I had to address the lack of information on the value of the market share of RTO. To compute
such a number, I collected data on the number of stores RTO firms and competitors have in the relevant
Ohio counties.
The resulting models is fairly sophisticated and captures the incentives and trade-offs faced by consumers
very well. The reader is now invited to turn to the next chapter of this dissertation where I present the
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results of the model estimation and provide evidence towards the robustness of these results. I also outline




5.6.1 Calibration of the income process and parameter frequency conversion
Modeling assumptions and results
The vast majority of the papers in the literature estimating labor income risk decompose log labor income











where the permanent component is traditionally modeled as an AR(1) process or a random walk process
(ρ = 1), the transitory and permanent innovations are distributed εit
iid∼ N ￿0,σ2ε￿, ηit iid∼ N ￿0,σ2η￿, and
serially uncorrelated and independent at all leads and lags.
Table A5.1 summarizes estimation results of this model by educational group obtained by Guvenen
(2009), which makes use labor earnings data covering the period 1968-1993. This study is the latest and
most complete in a long series of papers to estimate labor income risk processes. It is the chosen study to
calibrate the model in this paper.
Source Educ. group ρ σ2η σ2ε
Guvenen (2009) College 0.97 0.009 0.047
High school 0.97 0.011 0.052
Table A5.1: Estimates by education group.
We observe that the estimated persistence of the income shock is very high. Also, the standard deviations
of the annual permanent and transitory innovations is estimated to be in the 0.095-0.22 range. Interpreted
literally, this would mean that every year, about one-third of consumers experience positive or negative
shocks to their permanent income of greater than 15-38 percent. Similarly, each year about one-third (but
not the same one-third) of consumers experience transitory shocks of more than 15-38 percent in each year.
Parameter frequency conversion
The estimates obtained in the literature are based on annual data. I therefore need to make the frequency
conversion to obtain monthly parameter values. The steps employed in this conversion are based on results
presented in an early paper by Amemiya and Wu (1972) studying the effect of aggregation on autoregressive
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models. They show that for disaggregated time series following an AR(p) process, the process for the
aggregated series over m periods is an ARMA(p,q), with p = q when m is large enough, which is the case
for yearly-monthly and yearly-quarterly conversions.
To illustrate how the conversion is performed, I now present an analytical example of the effects of
aggregation when dealing with yearly and quarterly data. The extension to yearly and monthly data is
straightforward.
Family non-capital income in the PSID is defined as annual hourly earnings (annual labor incomes divided
by annual hours). Annual labor income in the PSID are annual averages as the following formula indicates14:
y˜t =
yt,4 + yt,3 + yt,2 + yt,1
4
(5.6)
I assume the quarterly process follows an AR(1) process, where the second equality in each line is derived
by successive recursion:
yt,4 = ρyt,3 + ut,4 = ρ
4yt−1,4 + ut,4 + ρut,3 + ρ2ut,2 + ρ3ut,1 (5.7)
yt,3 = ρyt,2 + ut,3 = ρ
4yt−1,3 + ut,3 + ρut,2 + ρ2ut,1 + ρ3ut−1,4 (5.8)
yt,2 = ρyt,1 + ut,2 = ρ
4yt−1,2 + ut,2 + ρut,1 + ρ2ut−1,4 + ρ3ut−1,3 (5.9)
yt,1 = ρyt−1,4 + ut,1 = ρ4yt−1,1 + ut,1 + ρut−1,4 + ρ2ut−1,3 + ρ3ut−1,2 (5.10)
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￿
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Table A5.2 applies these transformations to the annual estimates obtained in the literature to convert
them into monthly frequency, taking into account that V ar (u˜t) = V ar (ηt + εt) = σ2η + σ2ε , that is, the
innovation to log annual income is the sum of permanent and transitory innovations to income.
Annual Monthly
Source Educ. group ￿ρ V ar (u˜t) ρ σ2
Guvenen (2009) College 0.9700 0.0560 0.9975 0.0127
High school 0.9700 0.0630 0.9975 0.0143
Table A5.2: Adjusted Estimates by education group.
To see why V ar (u˜t) = V ar (ηt + εt) = σ2η + σ2ε , note that as mentioned above the parametrized in-
come process generally adopted in the literature, given by equations 5.4 and 5.5, can be understood as an
ARMA(1,1) process.






+ ηit = ρy
i
t−1 − ρεit−1 + ηit
I can therefore write the process for income as
yit = ρy
i
































Implications of the Model and
Counterfactual Analysis
6.1 Introduction and Research Questions
In this chapter I present the results of estimating the model developed in chapter 5 using transaction-level
data of RTO contracts. I also perform a series of robustness tests to increase the confidence in the estimation
procedure and results.
One of the greatest benefits of structural models is that they allow for broad possibilities in terms of
counterfactual exercises. The estimated model in this chapter is used to run “what if” scenarios to analyze
contract design. I show that there are a number of contract changes RTO firms can introduce to increase
consumer satisfaction and firm performance simultaneously. In particular, I perform various experiments
based upon the estimated model to answer three central research questions:
The early return option
This first questions is related to the early return option embedded in RTO contracts. One aspect of the
rent-to-own contract that stands out is its high degree of flexibility. The agreement emerged around 40
years ago as a highly flexible contract. Terms have not changed significantly over time, with the Association
of Progressive Rental Organizations (APRO), the industry association, taking a de-facto role of educating
new entrants to the industry and transmitting best practices1. APRO’s website states: “The unique rent-
1Evidence of this can be found in APRO’s website which has a whole section dedicated to RTO education for RTO chains.
This includes links to a virtual university, with courses including “Introduction to Rent-To-Own” and “Account Management in
Rent-To-Own”, their seminar schedule, and a Rent-to-Own code of ethics.
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to-own transaction sprang up in the 1970s in response to a growing consumer need for acquiring the use of
household products without incurring debt or jeopardizing the family’s credit. Rent-to-own customers [...]
desire consumer durable goods in their homes without the long-term financial obligations associated with
credit sales. There is no interest charged to consumers, no credit checks involved and customers can return
the merchandise at any time for any reason without penalty. This no-obligation, no-debt feature is the
cornerstone of rental-purchase”. When analyzing transaction-level data in chapter 4, I observed that some
customers seem to be taking advantage of the flexibility in the option to return items early. At the same
time, a large group of consumers does not seem to be making use of this lack of long-term commitment at
all.
This motivates the following research questions: What are the welfare implications of reducing the return
flexibility in RTO contracts? Could we improve the situation of consumers and firms offering the contract?
Can we find an optimal level of reduced flexibility that maximizes welfare?
The early purchase option
Industry participants are highly exposed to regulatory risk. An average of 25 bills that directly affect the
RTO industry are introduced per year at the state and federal levels of government2. The latest example of
federal regulation is the Consumer Rental Purchase Agreement Act which was assigned to a congressional
committee on April 15, 2013 and intends to assure meaningful disclosures of the terms of rental-purchase
agreements and to provide certain substantive rights to consumers under these agreements3. In Ohio, the
state where the dataset used in this study is from, regulation already imposes significant contract disclosures.
The state also introduced restrictions on the early purchase option schedule. The formula chosen to dictate
the shape of this schedule does not seem to follow an economic rationale, as indicated in section 3.4 in
chapter 3.
The current state of the early purchase option schedule regulation inspires the following questions: What
is the welfare cost of RTO regulation in terms of restrictions on the early purchase option price schedule?
What are the welfare implications of implementing a non-linear schedule, similar to the loan amortization
schedule found in typical mortgage contracts?
Delinquency
When looking at micro-level data in chapter 4, I find that the number of items involved in RTO agreements
that are stolen is considerably high. Almost 20% of TVs, 19% of electronics and 16% of computers end up
2See chapter 3 for a full coverage of the status of regulation in the industry.
3http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1551.
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in delinquency. This is a serious problem in the industry. These findings immediately prompt the question
of whether firms should invest in better delinquency control and implement more stringent rental initiation
conditions. And whether these investments could increase overall welfare if part of the potential savings
from lower delinquency levels are transferred to consumers.
This chapter is structured as follows: the results of estimating the model using transaction-level data of
RTO contracts is presented in section 6.2. Evidence pointing towards the robustness of the results is shown
in section 6.3. I analyze the consequences of a whole range of “what if” scenarios and present the results of
these exercises in section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Estimation results
This section describes the results of estimating the model parameters with real data of rent-to-own trans-
actions. I present results for five different product categories: appliances, furniture, TVs, computers and
electronics. Information on the contract terms for each of these categories is presented in table 5.1.
The results of estimating θ1 are presented in table 6.1, standard errors between parenthesis. The reader
is referred to section 6.6.1 in the appendix for a description of how these standard errors were computed.
N ϕ Γ δ κ
Appliances 1438 0.15 21.10 0.9995 -2.52
(0.08) (1.29) (0.0041) (0.15)
Furniture 1161 2.06 57.67 0.8706 -2.42
(0.21) (11.48) (0.0332) (0.15)
TVs 815 1.37 53.59 0.9357 -1.65
(0.11) (7.30) (0.0175) (0.12)
Computers 1225 1.71 21.95 0.8925 -1.83
(0.06) (1.07) (0.0093) (0.10)
Electronics 587 0.79 11.43 0.9556 -1.88
(0.09) (0.85) (0.0141) (0.15)
Table 6.1: Estimates and standard errors by category.
Standard errors are low for this type of model, which indicates parameters estimates have been recovered
with high precision.
To interpret these point estimates, I simulate the behavior of 10,000 consumers according to the estimated
81
model, for each product category. The left column of figure A6.1 in the appendix presents the results of
this exercise, where I aggregate the behavior of simulated consumers; I plot the proportion of customers
who decide to RET, PAY, EPO and STL at each point in time, for consumers remaining in the contract.
The model is capturing the incentives and trade-offs I was hoping it captured. During the first half of
the contract, the consumer has not built too much equity into the item and exercising the EPO remains
prohibitively expensive. Most consumers in the model decide to make a rental payment, while some of them
decide to return, those who are not satisfied with the item or suffered a low income draw. In the second half
of the contract, the EPO price has decreased to a level consumers can afford. I therefore observe a sharp
increase in the proportion of consumers that choose to exercise the EPO, with a consequent decrease in the
choice of making a rental payment or return the item.
A good way to evaluate the goodness of fit of the model is to look at its in-sample performance, that
is, how well the model fits observed consumer behavior. The right column in figure A6.1 in the appendix
presents the empirical proportions in the real data, computed in relation to individuals remaining in the
contract. These empirical proportions provide the identifying variation I need to estimate the model; these
are what we are trying to fit with the structural model4.
The model fits the consumer behavior observed in the rent-to-own transaction-level data very well. When
I simulate behavior based on the model and the estimated parameter vector, the patterns of behavior I obtain
are very close to the empirical ones. The model captures the levels of the different decisions as well as the
change in levels over time. The fit is really good for furniture, TVs, computers and electronics. The model
does not capture very well the behavior observed in appliances late in the life of the RTO contract. It is
hard to rationalize why for this product category the relative attractiveness of the EPO option decreases as
the contract approaches an end. With the EPO price going down over time, the relative attractiveness of
EPO should only increase. The industry participants I interviewed could not provide an explanation for the
behavior observed in the case of appliances.
6.2.1 Measures of consumer utility, firm revenue and market share
Using the behavior of 10,000 simulated consumers based on the calibrated model, I can obtain simulated
values of expected consumer utility for consumers who decide to go into RTO (“EVAL”), values of ex-
pected revenue to the firm from these consumers (“EREV”), and values of the expected probability of RTO
(“EPRTO”) - a proxy for market share. These metrics will be helpful to analyze the effect of contract term
changes on consumers and firms in section 6.4. They are computed as follows:
4The observed patterns of consumer behavior in these figures deserve a discussion which is presented in section 4.2.2 in
chapter 3.
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• EVAL - Simulated expected consumer utility: As a measure of consumer satisfaction under the RTO
contract, I will take the simulated EVt=0 (θ, y0, d0 = RTO) - the expected value to the consumer
of getting into the RTO contract described in section 5.3 - and average it for the 10,000 simulated
consumers.
• EREV - Simulated expected firm revenue: I first compute the revenue a RTO agreement generates
by discounting the revenue stream that each simulated consumer brings to the store, at a rate that
reflects the cost of capital to the firm5. However, as explained in section 4.2.2 in chapter 4, revenue
should be computed at the item level. Items are usually rented out more than once, that is, they
participate in more than one agreement. Items that are returned to the store are therefore capable
of generating future revenue. To account for this possibility, I adjust the revenue number for those
simulated agreements that end up in return to arrive at the revenue measure at the item level6. I then
average across simulated items to obtain the expected discounted revenue from RTO to the firm, or
EREV.
• EPRTO - Simulated expected probability of RTO: Obtained by computing the proportion of simulated
consumers that decide to enter the RTO contract. The consumer’s probability of choosing to go into
a RTO contract at t = 0 increases as the value to the consumer of entering a RTO contract goes up, a
result observed in equations 5.1 and 5.3. For that reason, EPRTO will move in the same direction as
EVAL. EPRTO can be thought of as a proxy for market share.
These numbers have been computed for the base case across the five different categories and are presented
in table A6.1 in the appendix, under the column “base case”.
6.3 Testing the robustness of the estimation procedure
The log-likelihood function of the dynamic problem under study is a highly non-linear multivariate function.
This function is maximized using the solver for nonlinear optimization KNITRO. Its state-of-the-art algo-
rithms tend to do a good job at finding global maxima7. In this section, I describe a series of robustness
tests I perform to increase the confidence in the estimation procedure and results.
5Using the CAPM, with β = 0.85 (the average of the βs of Rent-A-Center and Aaron’s, the only two publicly traded RTO
firms), rf = 1% and rm = 4.93% (arithmetic average return for equities for the period 2002-2011, data from Aswath Damodaran
at NYU), the resulting r is equal to 4.3%.
6I assume that returned items are rented out again according to the patterns observed in the data, presented in table 4.8 in
chapter 3. Appliances are involved in 1.73 agreements on average; furniture items in 1.83; TVs in 1.93; computers in 1.85; and
electronics in 2.12. When an item is returned, I assume it is re-rented and the fate of this subsequent agreement is determined
by the consumer behavior predicted by the model.
7Byrd et al. (2006).
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First, I test whether the estimation algorithm displays some sort of starting value dependence. For that
purpose, I perform the estimation procedure fifty times, using fifty randomly selected starting points. Figure
6.1a shows the results of this exercise for the case of electronics; very similar pictures emerge for the rest of
the categories. This figure supports the statement that the estimated parameter set corresponds to a global
maximum rather than to a local maximum.
Second, I test whether the parameter vector which maximizes the log-likelihood function is sensitive to
the utilization of different sets of simulated income chains. As was mentioned in section 5.4.1, evaluating the
log-likelihood function involves a numerical integration step for which I need to simulate NSIM=1000 number
of income chains for each individual in the dataset. Here I test whether drawing different sets of NSIM=1000
income chains affects the maximum likelihood estimate. Figure 6.1b shows evidence of this exercise for ten
different sets of simulated income chains, again for the case of electronics, with very similar results for all
other categories. I see that the maximum likelihood estimate remains the same across simulation sets. These









































































(b) Sensitiveness to simulation draws
Figure 6.1: Results of robustness tests.
Lastly, I also checked whether increasing the number of simulations from NSIM=1000 to NSIM=5000
has any effect on the maximum likelihood estimate. There was no change in the estimate, which leads us to




Structural econometric models are useful tools for the evaluation of counterfactual policies. In this section, I
describe several of these experiments based upon the estimated model. I will alter contract terms and present
the predictions of the calibrated model under the new scenarios. I use the demand estimates to analyze
contract design, that is, how the different dimensions of the RTO contract affect consumer satisfaction and
firm profitability. The goal of the counterfactual exercises is to check whether there exist potential changes
to the contract terms that make both consumers and firms better off.
I study the effect of changes in each of the four options consumers face at each point in time - the return
option, the rental payment option, the early purchase option and the stealing option - in order to address
the research questions outlined in the introduction to this chapter.
The outcomes of various experiments are compared to a benchmark, which is simply simulated consumer
behavior based on the estimates obtained in section 6.2. I call this the “base case” . For each counterfactual
I simulate the behavior of 10,000 consumers.
Table A6.1 in the appendix summarizes the results of these exercises in terms of expected consumer
utility, firm revenue and the probability of RTO, as defined in section 6.2.1. I also present plots depicting the
dynamic behavior of simulated consumers under the new scenarios. For the sake of space, I include graphs
for the case of electronics, all other categories displaying strikingly similar patterns.
6.4.1 The return option
The RTO contract has a very flexible item return policy. Once the contract is initiated, the consumer has the
right to return the item to the store without penalty, at any point in time. This feature is not present in any
other contractual arrangement that competes with the RTO contract, and has been a central characteristic
of the contract since it emerged around around 40 years ago.
The industry association repeatedly states that RTO customers highly value the convenience of the
contract8, the early return option adding to the convenience of the arrangement. This degree of flexibility,
however, may be driving up the cost of the RTO transaction to consumers and affecting firm performance.
In the data I observe many customers exercise this return option early in the life of the contract; I also note
that a significant number of consumers rent to term or exercise the EPO towards the end of the contract.
The data presented in table 4.4a are particularly revealing. There we can see that around 50% of the
contracts end up with a return during the first half of the agreement, and close to 50% of the contracts do
not culminate with a return (the EPO is exercised, the agreement is carried to term or the items is stolen)9.
8APRO (2013).
9The reader is referred to section 4.2.2 in chapter 3 for a detailed presentation of observed contract outcomes.
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The latter consumers may be subsidizing the cost of the RTO contracts to the former.
In this section I therefore explore two counterfactuals:
• No RET: I eliminate the return option. Once the contract has begun, consumers are not allowed to
return the item to the store. This change makes the RTO contract look more similar to a credit sale
or a pure lease transaction.
• Costly RET: I impose a penalty on early returns. The consumer must pay a fee equal to half the
monthly rental rate if she wants to return the item to the store during the first half of the contract.
Simultaneously, a 5% reduction in the monthly rental rate is introduced. These two changes in the
contract intend to revert the cross-subsidy mentioned above. For the case of electronics, for instance,
with a contract length of 12 months and rental rate of $62 per month, a consumer returning the item
in months 1 to 5 would have to pay a $31 fee, and the monthly rental rate would now be slightly under
$59.
The results of these exercises are presented in figure 6.2 and table A6.1.
We observe that under counterfactual “No RET”, firm revenue decreases substantially, consumers are
worse off, and the expected probability of RTO, our proxy for market share, decreases with respect to the
the base case. It is clear from figures 6.2a and 6.2b that consumers substitute away from the return choice
into the delinquency option.
Counterfactual “Costly RET” shows very interesting results. Imposing a small dollar penalty on con-
sumers who return items early and reducing the monthly rate by 5% seems to give consumers the right
incentives. Consumers avoid the delinquency option and stay longer in the RTO contract as seen in figure
6.2c. Consumers receive on average higher utility from the RTO contract for all item categories10. Firms
offering the contract are better off, with higher expected revenue across all categories. Market share increases
as a result of the higher mean value of entering a RTO contract.
This early return penalty seems to be eliminating the externality that early returners were imposing on
consumers who wished to stay longer in the contract. I conclude a small penalty on early returns could
improve the RTO experience for both consumers and firms offering the contract.
It is not surprising, then, that some industry participants are already offering contracts with reduced
flexibility in terms of early returns. One example comes from the firm Why Not Lease It. This company
offers lease terms for durable goods purchased at retailers around the country. Contrary to a typical RTO
contract, they require a minimum lease term of five months, after which the consumer has the option to
renew the lease, return the item, or purchase the item by exercising an early buyout option. The model in
10Remember EVAL is an average across simulated consumers. Some customers are better off, some are worse off.
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this paper predicts that such a contractual arrangement could work better for consumers and firms than the
traditional RTO contract.



















(a) Simulated Base Case



















(b) Counterfactual - No RET



















(c) Counterfactual - Costly RET
Figure 6.2: Return option counterfactual behavior.
Welfare maximizing reduction in flexibility
Counterfactual “Costly RET” has shown that imposing a small dollar penalty on consumers who return items
early and simultaneously reducing the monthly rate, can be welfare increasing. The natural next step is to
find the welfare maximizing policy involving a reduction in the flexibility of return of the RTO contract.




wi (αEV ALi + (1− α)EREVi) (6.1)
where wi is the weight assigned to each product category, computed as the ratio of the number of observed
agreements for that category over the total number of RTO agreements, and α is the weight assigned to
consumer surplus, which I assume adopts a value 0.5. The defined welfare function is simply the weighted
average of welfare across product categories.
I then assume that the penalty for early return remains constant at half the monthly rental rate and
search for the length of the contract the penalty is to remain in place, and for the monthly rental rate







where n is the proportion of the contract the return penalty is kept in place, and d is the rental rate discount
percentage.
I find that welfare is maximized when returning the item is made costlier only during the first third of the
agreement, and consumers enjoy a reduction of 10% in the monthly rental rate. Consumer behavior under
this policy is qualitatively similar to that presented in figure 6.2c. Column “Welfare Max RET” in table
A6.1 contains the levels of consumer and producer surplus achieved by this contract change.
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Instead of charging customers the penalty for early return when they walk into the store to return the
item, RTO firms could introduce a security deposit system. Each month, the firm could collect a security
deposit from the client consisting of a fixed dollar amount on top of the monthly rental rate. This deposit
would accumulate in an account under the customer’s name and would be returned in full after a third of
the contract length has passed. If the customer wants to return the item before that time, she would have
to give up on the security deposit.
6.4.2 The early purchase option
Consumers entering a RTO contract have the option to become owners of the item through payment of a
pre-specified cash amount. The early payout option price is regulated in many states, including Ohio, the
state the data in this paper comes from. The formula chosen by Ohio regulators to dictate the shape of the
EPO price schedule does not seem to follow an economic rationale.
In this section I therefore explore the following counterfactuals:
• No EPO: I eliminate the early purchase option. The only path to ownership available to consumers is
renting to term. Under this scenario, the RTO contract looks more similar to a pure lease arrangement.
• Steeper EPO: The early purchase option price starts at a higher level than under the base case,
but decreases faster over time. As depicted in figure 6.3, under current regulation11 represented by
the blue line, the EPO price schedule has a negative slope of one half times the rental rate. In the
counterfactual scenario, represented by the red line, the EPO price is higher at t = 0 than under the
current regulation, but the schedule presents a steeper slope of negative two thirds times the rental
rate12. Once the EPO price reaches the monthly rental rate, it remains at that level thereafter.
11The reader is referred to section 3.4.3 in 3 chapter for a detailed discussion of different aspects of RTO regulation in Ohio,
including EPO regulation.
12The intercept of new the schedule has been chosen so that it crosses the line dictated by regulation at exactly half of the
contract duration. For the case of electronics with twelve-month contracts, the two lines cross at month number six.
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Figure 6.3: Counterfactual - Steeper EPO Schedule.
The results of these exercises are presented in figure 6.4 and table A6.1.
We see that under counterfactual “No EPO”, consumers are worse off across the board. Those consumers
who relied heavily on the early purchase option during the second half of the contract are forced to make
rental payments and acquire the item by renting to term. This substitution presents itself clearly when we
compare figures 6.4a and 6.4b. The effect on firm revenue of shutting down the EPO possibility is unclear.
Revenue goes down slightly for appliances, TVs and electronics. It increases for furniture and computers.
Some consumers substitute away from EPO to PAY, which would increase revenue to the firm. But some
decide to RET or STL instead, which would bring revenue down. The simulated probability of going into
RTO decreases with respect to the base case. Overall, it does not seem to be a good idea to shut down the
EPO channel: consumers, who reportedly value the convenience of the RTO contract, are clearly worse off.
And there is no clear evidence that the situation would improve for RTO firms.
The “NO EPO” counterfactual could be interpreted as a scenario where the EPO price is set at a constant,
very high level. I have run a series of counterfactual exercises where I set the EPO price at a constant, but
lower level. Examples are constant EPO prices at two, four and six times the monthly rental rate of the
item. What I find is that you cannot increase EVAL and increase EREV from consumers who decide to go
into RTO simultaneously. To make consumers better off, the constant EPO price has to be set at a level
so low that it reduces expected revenue. To increase expected revenue from consumers entering RTO, the
constant EPO price has to be set at a level so high that it reduces EVAL and the expected probability of
going into RTO significantly. Results of these exercise are available upon request.
Finally, counterfactual “Steeper EPO” shows that pivoting the EPO schedule in the manner presented
in figure 6.3, such that the early purchase options starts off being more expensive but becomes cheaper
faster, can simultaneously improve the experience of producers and consumers. Under the example under
consideration, consumers are better off. We observe in figure 6.4c that they tend to exercise the EPO earlier
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in the contract. The firm has higher expected revenue from RTO for appliances and electronics. While under
this particular example furniture, TVs and computers yield lower EREV, the objective of higher EVAL and
higher EREV can be achieved by doing some fine tuning in terms of the intercept and the slope of the EPO
curve.
The reason consumers and the firm can simultaneously be made better off is that the new EPO schedule
disincentivizes EPO in the beginning of the contract, that is when EPO is relatively unattractive to consumers
anyways, and incentivizes EPO later in the contract, when the EPO is relatively more attractive. This is
also when items are worth less to the firm since they have suffered depreciation.



















(a) Simulated Base Case



















(b) Counterfactual - No EPO



















(c) Counterfactual - Steeper EPO
Figure 6.4: Early purchase option counterfactual behavior.
Welfare maximizing EPO price schedule
The natural extension of the “Steeper EPO” counterfactual is to find the linear EPO price schedule that
maximizes welfare. The goal is to maximize equation 6.1 with respect to the intercept and the slope of the






, where a is the intercept and b is the slope of the
schedule.
I find that the welfare maximizing EPO schedule has a negative slope of 0.75 and crosses the schedule
dictated by regulation at exactly half the duration of the RTO contract. Consumer behavior under this
policy is qualitatively similar to that presented in figure 6.4c, where we observed agents tend to exercise the
EPO earlier in the contract. Column “Welfare Max Linear EPO” in table A6.1 contains the levels of
consumer and producer surplus achieved by this contract change.
There is no real reason, however, why the EPO price schedule should be confined to have a linear form.
Counterfactuals show that the adoption of a simple quadratic schedule can perform better in terms of welfare
than the optimal linear schedule. One simple example is given by a schedule with the following functional
form: pepot = a (t− T )2 + p, where T is the length of the RTO contract, p is the monthly rental rate, and
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the parameter a is chosen so that the proposed schedule crosses the price function dictated by regulation
at exactly half the duration of the RTO contract, as shown in figure 6.5. This functional form is preferred
to the linear one since it does a better job at disincentivizing EPO during the first half of the contract and
incentivizing it during the second half. The numerical results of this counterfactual can be found in table
A6.1 under the column “Non-linear EPO” .
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Figure 6.5: Counterfactual - Non-linear EPO Schedule. The red schedule follows the formula pepot =
a (t− T )2 + p, where the parameter a is chosen so that the proposed schedule crosses the price function
dictated by regulation at exactly half the duration of the RTO contract.
To summarize, the model indicates that the early purchase option schedule currently imposed by reg-
ulation is not welfare maximizing. This is not surprising since there is no economic analysis behind its
choice. The choice seems to be motivated by the simplicity of a linear form, and with the goal of protecting
consumers by guaranteeing a maximum price at which they can exercise the option at various points in time.
I hope this section motivates further discussion regarding the optimality of the chosen schedule in Ohio as
well as in other states.
6.4.3 The stealing option
In chapter 4 I have shown that RTO stores face a serious delinquency problem. The percentage of items
that end up being charged off because the customer stops making payments and refuses to return the item
is considerably high. Almost 20% of TVs, 19% of electronics and 16% of computers undergo unfavorable
charge-offs at the item level.
The fact that RTO firms are highly exposed to delinquency motivates the following research questions:
Should firms invest in better delinquency control and implement more stringent rental initiation conditions?
Could these investments increase overall welfare if part of the potential savings from lower delinquency levels
are transferred to consumers?
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To address these questions I begin by running a counterfactual exercise that assumes the RTO store could
fully prevent customers from running away with items. I run this exercise - the “No STL” counterfactual -
and observe that under the new scenario consumers substitute away from STL into RET, as can be seen by
comparing figures 6.6a and 6.6b. Table A6.1 shows that while consumer utility and market shares decrease
only slightly, the revenue the store derives from the contract increases significantly. The store could transfer
part of its increased revenue to consumers in the form of a lower monthly rental rate.
Taking this into account, I run a counterfactual exercise where I assume STL can be fully prevented
and monthly rental rates are decreased by 5% simultaneously - the “No STL 2” counterfactual. In this
situation, both the firm and the consumers are better off. Numerical results are presented in table A6.1.
The dynamic behavior of consumers is very similar to that presented in figure 6.6b, which displays behavior
before the introduction of the 5% discount.
In fact, the model predicts that if the firm could perfectly prevent delinquency, it could offer contracts
with a 13% reduction in the monthly rental rate and still obtain the same revenue as in the base case.
Delinquency control is not costless, however. Either through investment in technology or larger customer
screening efforts, the firm would have to allocate funds to achieve a reduction in unfavorable charge-offs.
This means that the maximum reduction in the monthly rental rate the firm could offer would be lower than
13%. The exact number depends on how costly bringing delinquency to control is.
The screening mechanism currently in place consists of the submission by the customer of a “Lease Order
Form” containing personal information and contact information of three personal references13. Interviews
with a store manager of the independent firm revealed that customers who cannot provide at least two
personal references able to verify the customer’s address are not approved.
The analysis in this section points towards the need for a better screening mechanism oriented towards
theft prevention. More stringent rental initiation conditions should be put in place. Given the state of
development of the electronic payment system, those banked consumers could be asked to sign an ACH14
authorization, which would allow the RTO store to electronically withdraw a specified amount of money
from the customer’s bank account on an agreed upon day each payment period. RTO stores should also
consider investing in technology to locate their priciest items should the customer stop paying and refuse to
return the item.
An alternative way for RTO firms to hedge themselves against harmful delinquency is to introduce a
security deposit system similar to the one suggested earlier in the chapter. Each month the firm could
collect a fixed dollar amount from the client, on top of the monthly rental rate. This dollar amount would be
13See section 3.2.1 of chapter 3 for a detailed description of the RTO process.
14ACH stands for Automated Clearing House.
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put in escrow under the customer’s name and would be returned in full if the item is returned or purchased.
The store would keep the funds in the event of delinquency. This system would make delinquency costlier.
Whatever the chosen path to reduce delinquency is, the results from this section indicate that taking
steps in that direction can be a profitable investment for the firm and can also make the average consumer
better off.



















(a) Simulated Base Case



















(b) Counterfactual - No STL
Figure 6.6: Delinquency counterfactual behavior.
6.5 Conclusion
To analyze the incentives and trade-offs consumers face in the context of rent-to-own, I estimate a structural
model of consumer behavior using proprietary transaction-level data. The model does a very good job at
fitting consumer behavior observed in the data. It displays great in sample performance.
The set of robustness tests I perform also yield favorable results, which increases my confidence in the
estimation procedure and estimation results. In particular, I find that the estimation algorithm does not
suffer from starting value dependence and that the numerical integration step of the estimation procedure
is not affecting point estimates.
The results of the counterfactual exercises show that certain terms of the RTO contract can be altered
to improve the situation of consumers and firms offering the contract.
Regarding the very flexible item return policy, I observe that customers deciding to rent to term or to
exercise the EPO late in the life of the contract might be cross-subsidizing those consumers who return items
early at no cost. Counterfactuals show that imposing a small dollar penalty on consumers who return items
early and simultaneously reducing the monthly rate by 10% seems to give consumers the right incentives.
Customers cut down on early returns, avoid the delinquency option and stay longer in the RTO contract.
This makes both consumers and RTO stores better off since the early return penalty seems to be eliminating
the externality that early returners were imposing on consumers who wished to stay longer into the contract.
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I also observe that lifting restrictions on the EPO price schedule could also lead to improved consumer and
firm experience. Counterfactual “Steeper EPO” shows that pivoting the EPO schedule such that the early
purchase options starts off being more expensive but becomes cheaper faster, can simultaneously improve
the experience of producers and consumers. The reason for this is that the new EPO schedule disincentivizes
EPO in the beginning of the contract, that is when EPO is relatively unattractive to consumers anyways, and
incentivizes EPO later in the contract, when the EPO is relatively more attractive. This is also when items
are worth less to the firm since they have suffered depreciation. Counterfactuals show that the adoption of
a simple quadratic schedule can perform even better than the optimal linear schedule. I hope these results
motivate policy discussion regarding the optimality of the early purchase option price schedule imposed by
state regulators.
Finally, counterfactuals show that a tighter screening and delinquency control could generate savings to
the RTO stores, part of which could then be transferred to consumers in the form of lower rental rates. In
chapter 3 I had observed that item delinquency was hurting firm performance. The model in this chapter
confirms these findings and proposes changes to contract terms to improve the experience of agents. Results
indicate that taking steps towards controlling delinquency can be a good investment for the firm and can
also make the average consumer better off.
The counterfactuals analyzed in this chapter represent a small sample of the myriad of exercises that
could be run. I hope the ones I chose promote constructive policy discussions, and that this discussion in
turn motivates the use of my model to run further exercises.
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6.6 Appendix
6.6.1 Computing standard errors






In practice, the covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimator is computed by replacing θ0 by






























where the second line results from applying the information matrix equality.
Standard deviations are obtained by the BHHH method15, which replaces the expectation in the second





























. . . ∂LN (θ)∂θK

To compute the elements of X, I follow the centered finite difference approximation approach, which
replaces the derivatives in X by appropriate numerical differentiation formulae.
The standard error of each element of θˆ is therefore given by the square root of the main-diagonal entries
of the matrix (X ￿X)−1.
15For more information the reader is referred to Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). BHHH is an acronym of the four originators
of the method: Berndt, B. Hall, R. Hall, and Jerry Hausman.
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6.6.2 Figures







































(b) Appliances real data







































(d) Furniture real data







































(f) TVs real data







































(h) Computers real data







































(j) Electronics real data
Figure A6.1: Empirical patterns in real data vs. behavior of simulated consumers.
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6.6.3 Tables




EPO No STL No STL 2
Appliances 121.8 121.3 122.2 122.4 119.4 122.7 122.6 122.8 121.5 121.8
Furniture 128.2 128.0 135.2 135.6 125.1 128.3 128.6 127.7 128.1 128.3
TVs 138.5 138.0 145.3 145.4 136.4 138.6 138.3 138.8 138.2 138.5
Computers 122.8 122.6 124.7 126.6 122.4 123.4 124.7 124.8 122.7 123.5
Electronics 118.8 118.0 120.8 121.1 118.2 119.0 119.6 119.8 118.2 119.4
(a) EVAL




EPO No STL No STL 2
Appliances $526.3 $425.4 $682.2 $694.4 $507.0 $546.9 $539.6 $542.8 $536.9 $535.7
Furniture $718.4 $496.1 $735.4 $769.8 $747.3 $677.5 $720.7 $721.9 $743.6 $735.5
TVs $1,203.1 $784.5 $1,605.8 $1,608.1 $1,202.6 $1,180.2 $1,164.8 $1,150.8 $1,287.5 $1,285.8
Computers $651.8 $477.3 $757.8 $763.6 $664.5 $639.8 $652.4 $654.3 $688.7 $675.7
Electronics $502.9 $341.7 $670.2 $681.4 $499.7 $507.9 $506.7 $508.3 $530.7 $528.4
(b) EREV




EPO No STL No STL 2
Appliances -1.6% 7.6% 7.8% -0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% -0.1% 0.0%
Furniture -1.6% 0.5% 0.6% -0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% -0.1% 0.1%
TVs -3.4% 5.2% 5.2% -0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.6% -0.6% 0.0%
Computers -1.4% 8.9% 9.1% -0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% -0.2% 0.1%
Electronics -1.6% 0.7% 0.8% -0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% -0.2% 0.1%
(c) EPRTO - Percentage change with respect to the base case
Table A6.1: Counterfactual analysis.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This dissertation develops the most detailed analysis of the RTO contract, the industry’s institutional details
and its regulatory framework. It is also the first fully independent study of RTO using micro-level data. It
additionally contains the first piece of work on the RTO industry to employ structural estimation techniques,
and therefore the first to credibly analyze the consequences of contract changes, regulatory changes and other
counterfactual exercises on social welfare.
The RTO industry, as many other alternative financial services, is subject to significant debate. Con-
sumer advocacy groups are critical of the value of RTO to consumers. The high cost of RTO merchandise to
consumers, and the disproportionate profitability of RTO stores are repeatedly pointed out by these groups.
The industry association, in turn, highlights that RTO is one of the most flexible transactions in the mar-
ketplace and fervently denies consumer advocates’ accusations. It states that only RTO contracts offer the
consumer the flexibility of a no-obligation, no-penalty return transaction that provides an ownership option.
RTO has not, however, drawn much attention in academic circles. In this dissertation, I build on past
papers on RTO and suplement the analysis presented in them with multiple other sources of information. I
include data from the industry’s official trade association, and regulatory bodies from different states. I have
also performed visits to several RTO stores, conducted interviews with industry participants, and got access
to relevant documentation, including forms used to perform customer screening, actual RTO contract sheets
and payment receipts. Most importantly, I got access to and studied a proprietary micro-level dataset of RTO
agreements. A proper understanding of the RTO market is essential to assess the value of the transaction to
consumers and firms, as well as to design sensible regulatory frameworks. I hope my dissertation helps resolve
the controversies surrounding the industry, acts as a guide to the RTO world, and promotes constructive
policy discussions.
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In this thesis I describe the nature of the agreement and present it as a unique bundle of services
and financial options, not available together in other contractual arrangements. My analysis shows that
while rent-to-own looks expensive compared to cash retail and credit sale transactions, it does not when
benchmarked against pure leases. And those unbanked or underbanked U.S. households wanting to access
durable goods may have nowhere else to turn to. There is no evidence that the rent-to-own activity is
overwhelmingly profitable. The industry seems to be competitive and the performance of rent-to-own firms
stands roughly in the median of the distribution of profitability across industries in the U.S.
The reduced-form analysis carried out using proprietary micro-level data from a medium-sized rent-to-
own chain in Ohio helps understand consumer behavior and contract use in RTO. I addressed the controversy
regarding the proportion of RTO customers that rent items to term. Consumer advocates report the great
majority of them do; the industry association states 75% return the rented item within the first four months
of the contract. The analysis of micro-level data shows that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. The
data also reveal that consumers respond to the incentives and trade-offs presented to them by the contract.
During the first half of the RTO agreement, the consumer has not built too much equity in the contract and
exercising the early payout option remains prohibitively expensive. I observe most consumers decide to make
a rental payment, while some of them decide to return the item, presumably those who are not satisfied
with the item or suffered a low income shock. During the second half, the EPO price has decreased to a
level consumers can afford. I therefore observe a sharp increase in the proportion of individuals who exercise
the EPO, with a consequent decrease in that of payment and returns. Many consumers just stop making
payments and do not return the item. Delinquency is a serious problem in the industry that significantly
affects the performance of RTO firms. Furniture items and appliances, items that suffer the least from
delinquency, are the most profitable product categories.
Counterfactual exercises indicate the industry as a whole could benefit from changes in the RTO agree-
ment. The flexibility of the contract in terms of the early return option should be revisited. Such flexibility
appears to remain from the early days of the industry and firms should analyze whether reducing it could
improve performance and consumer experience. Firms should also consider investing in tighter screening
and delinquency control. The model indicates these measures could generate savings to the RTO stores,
part of which could then be transferred to consumers in the form of lower rental rates. Finally, regulation
restricting the shape of the early purchase option schedule should be modified. The model shows that the
schedule could be altered in such a way as to make both consumers and the firm better off.
As much as I intend to give the reader a much better understanding of the RTO marketplace, there are
many more questions on the industry that still need to be addressed.
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Directions of future work
The following represents a list of what in my opinion are the most interesting questions that remain unan-
swered:
• Screening and pricing: Why is there no risk-based pricing in this industry? Does this lead to
harmful cross-subsidization across high and low risk customers? How can we improve the screening
mechanisms RTO firms use to isolate good from bad risks?
• Consumer attention and rationality: The RTO agreement is not a simple contract and there is
always the question of whether consumers really understand it. There is evidence in other markets
that the understanding of contract terms by consumers can be very limited. Woodward and Hall
(2010) shows that in the mortgage market, where a 2x1 vector represents the charges associated with
a transaction, borrowers treat the two charges independently, failing to recognize their interrelation1.
This would lead to an analysis of optimal advertisement, price tag and contract disclosure regulation.
How can we tailor regulation to address cognitive defects from which customers are most likely to
suffer? In addition, it could be argued that the assumptions used in the model of this chapter, i.e.
that consumers are rational intertemporal optimizers, might not hold. Can we better understand the
deviations from rational behavior RTO consumers suffer from?
• Repeat business and the value of relationships: Do relationships matter? Do consumers with
more than one outstanding rental, or with past rentals, act differently from first-time consumers?
• Competition and industry dynamics: Is the aggressive expansion of the two industry giant publicly
traded firms good or bad for consumers? How are independent chains reacting to this phenomenon?
Can we model the entry and exit dynamics of this market?
• Inventory management and bargaining: How do independent chains and the two public firms
procure merchandise? How does this affect price competition? Can we model the bargaining process
between wholesalers and independent chains / large public firms? Interviews with the president of the
independent chain revealed that independents have formed a nationwide buying cooperative specifically
for the RTO industry, with over 150 member companies representing more than 2,800 store locations2.
Has the creation of this cooperative improved the situation of independent operators?
1I thank Michael Grubb for this suggestion.
2This cooperative is called TRIB Group (http://tribgroup.com/). Members gather twice a year to determine buying polices
for that period. After prices have been negotiated with suppliers, each member of the group makes its own buying decisions.
Purchases are made in trade shows, for the most part.
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This list is not intended to be exhaustive. Many questions remain in the context of a large, interesting,
and severely under studied industry. I hope this study motivates future researchers to contribute to our
understanding of rent-to-own and other alternative financial services.
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